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I. Introduction
In June of 2003 Officer Billy Collins was called to a domestic
disturbance in the city of Corpus Christi, Texas.1 The source of the
disruption, Christopher DeLeon, refused to leave his home, and
Collins attempted to take him into custody.2 The two men fought,
and the police officer sprayed DeLeon with mace several times
before drawing his baton.3 According to DeLeon’s account, the two
men wrestled over the baton and DeLeon eventually overcame
Officer Collins, forcing him to the ground.4 DeLeon then backed up
and stood against the wall with his hands in the air, his
two-year-old child beside him.5 His wife stepped into the space
between the officer and her husband.6 Officer Collins then drew his
weapon and, as an unarmed DeLeon protested from across the

1. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007);
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, No. C-05-096, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44191, at
*2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005).
2. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 651.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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room, shot at DeLeon four times.7 DeLeon fell to the ground, and
Collins shot at him twice more.8 In total, Officer Collins hit DeLeon
with four bullets: twice in the chest, once in the side, and once in
his left arm.9
Once the violence ceased, DeLeon (who survived the shooting)
was charged with aggravated assault of a police officer for his role
in the fight.10 Instead of proceeding to trial, DeLeon entered into a
deferred adjudication program,11 part of which required him to
plead guilty to the charge of aggravated assault of a police officer.12
DeLeon paid a $2,500 fine and was put on probation for ten years.13
Following successful completion of his probationary period,
DeLeon would become eligible to have his charges dismissed.14
Subsequent to his plea, however, and before completing the
probationary period required by the diversion program, DeLeon
filed a complaint against Collins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,15
asserting false arrest, false imprisonment, use of excessive force,
and malicious prosecution.16 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas dismissed DeLeon’s complaint for
failure to state a claim,17 finding that his suit was barred under
the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Heck v.
Humphrey.18 The Heck doctrine, which is discussed in detail
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Texas’s deferred adjudication program is one of several pretrial
programs discussed in this Note, all of which will be referred to as “pretrial
diversion programs” for the sake of consistency.
12. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007).
13. Id. at 653.
14. Id.
15. The statute, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides that
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
16. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 651.
17. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, No. C-05-096, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44191, at *2, *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005).
18. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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below,19 essentially bars a would-be plaintiff from bringing a civil
rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if doing so would call into
question the underlying conviction.20 If DeLeon won his civil rights
suit, for example, it might imply that his conviction (i.e., his guilty
plea and probation term) was invalid. The incongruity of a
conviction followed by a vindication of a civil rights suit is exactly
what the Heck doctrine purports to protect against.21 The Heck
doctrine thus necessarily implicates the question of whether a
defendant’s completion of pretrial diversion programs constitutes
a conviction. Under Heck, a § 1983 action may only proceed if the
conviction or sentence underlying the challenge will not be called
into question.22 This has come to be known as a “favorable
termination” requirement.23 In DeLeon’s case, because DeLeon
pleaded guilty and executed a sworn statement that he
intentionally struck Officer Collins,24 the district court found “that

19. See infra Part III.C (tracing the development and subsequent
interpretation of the doctrine).
20. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (holding that a potential § 1983 plaintiff “must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”); DeLeon, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44191, at *3 (“A plaintiff is barred from bringing a section 1983
claim if it is a collateral attack on the judgment in his criminal proceeding.”).
21. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85 (“This Court has long expressed similar
concerns for finality and consistency and has generally declined to expand
opportunities for collateral attack.”).
22. See id. at 487 (“[T]he district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence.”).
23. See id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court appears to take the
position that . . . § 1983 requires (and, presumably, has always required) plaintiffs
seeking damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement to show the
favorable termination of the underlying proceeding.”); S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The requirement that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed, expunged, or invalidated is analogous to the similar
requirement in the tort of malicious prosecution and is called the ‘favorable
termination’ requirement of Heck.”); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir.
2005) (“[W]e hold the ARD program is not a favorable termination under Heck.”).
24. See DeLeon, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44191, at *5 (“In addition to entering
a guilty plea, plaintiff executed a sworn judicial confession stipulating that he
‘knowingly and intentionally’ struck Officer Collins.”).
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plaintiff’s plea of guilty and the deferred adjudication shall be
treated as a conviction.”25 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.26
DeLeon’s experience, in which he (perhaps unknowingly)
traded his right to bring a civil rights action for the option of
entering a deferral program, provides an apt example of the
difficult, and often severe, consequences that stem from the Heck
doctrine as it is currently applied by several courts of appeals.
Pretrial diversion programs such as the deferred adjudication
program DeLeon entered into are prevalent in state and federal
courts across the country.27 Indeed, they have been touted as an
advance in criminal justice reform, allowing those who have
committed or been accused of relatively minor crimes to avoid the
costs of a trial.28 Similarly, such programs provide overburdened
courts with an alternate way to deal with the flood of relatively
routine cases.29 And pretrial diversion programs promise a host of
cost savings to the state and federal systems that implement
them.30 A man like DeLeon, accused of assault, would
25. Id.
26. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“We conclude that a deferred adjudication order is a conviction for the purposes
of Heck’s favorable termination rule.”).
27. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2010) [hereinafter DOJ
RESEARCH] (cataloguing various types of pretrial diversion programs including
“statewide diversion programs, prebooking programs, postbooking programs, and
post-plea programs”); infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text (summarizing
and evaluating federal and state pretrial diversion programs).
28. See, e.g., CHARLES COLSON TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL CORRECTIONS,
TRANSFORMING PRISONS, RESTORING LIVES ix (2016) [hereinafter TASK FORCE],
https://perma.cc/GLQ6-VZ55 (PDF) (highlighting the benefits of implementing
pretrial diversion programs in the federal system, including reducing costs,
improving public safety, preventing future crimes, and rehabilitation).
29. See, e.g., DOJ RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 3 (“Pretrial diversion
programs have been shown to be time-effective because they keep court dockets
from becoming too large.”); CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, CRIME & JUSTICE
INST., PRETRIAL PROGRESS: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES & SERVICES IN
CALIFORNIA 4 (2015) (“[C]ounties implementing pretrial practices are becoming
pioneers in a larger shift toward reducing over-reliance on incarceration and
instead aligning local resources with best practices—a shift with significant
public support.”).
30. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at xi (listing a potential savings of
$5 billion dollars if certain recommendations surrounding federal pretrial
diversion programs were to be implemented).
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understandably be eager to accept a plea deal and return to his
work and family, rather than risk time in prison or jail.
Furthermore, he might well be willing to accept a wide variety of
plea bargains to avoid the collateral consequences that often stem
from a criminal conviction.31 Why, then, should DeLeon, and others
like him, be forced to give up a legitimate civil rights action in order
to take advantage of these programs? Furthermore, DeLeon and
others like him cannot even be fully aware of what rights they are
giving up, if the courts themselves are uncertain.
As it currently stands, the collateral consequences of accepting
a deal involving participation in a pretrial diversion program differ
based on where the accused happens to live. In particular, circuit
courts disagree on whether participation in a pretrial diversion
program counts as a favorable termination of the conviction or
sentence such that a § 1983 action challenging the conviction can
proceed.32 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second33 and Third34 Circuits
consider pretrial diversion programs to be convictions such that a
subsequent § 1983 action would be barred. However, the Sixth,35
Tenth,36 and Eleventh37 Circuits have held the opposite.
31. See National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction,
NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., https://perma.cc/43PK-WBFL (last visited Sept. 17,
2019) (providing a searchable database of collateral consequences) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. Compare Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (“[T]he ARD program imposes several
burdens upon the criminal defendant not consistent with innocence, including a
probationary term . . . . We agree . . . that probation constitutes an ‘unfavorable’
period of judicially imposed limitations on freedom.”), and Taylor v. Gregg, 36
F.3d 453, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that pretrial diversion programs are not
favorable terminations), with Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095
(10th Cir. 2009) (“The diversion agreements resulted in deferral of prosecution of
the offenses at issue. As a consequence . . . there are no ‘outstanding judgments’
or ‘convictions or sentences’ against [the plaintiff].”).
33. See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e hold [that
a] trial rehabilitation program is not a termination in favor of the accused for
purposes of a civil rights suit.”).
34. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e hold the
[pretrial diversion] program is not a favorable termination under Heck.”).
35. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“We hold that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.”).
36. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1095 (“[W]e have determined that the
Kansas pretrial diversion agreements are not outstanding convictions and
therefore these § 1983 claims impugning their validity are not barred by Heck.”).
37. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1252 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[We]
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment . . . on the grounds that
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Following the Introduction, Part II of this Note gives an
overview of federal and state pretrial diversion programs. Part III
explores the statutory and doctrinal background of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, including its interaction with another civil rights statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute. Both statutes are
essential to understanding the Heck doctrine’s purpose and
application to pretrial diversion participants. Part III also explores
the development and interpretation of the Heck doctrine in four
Supreme Court cases. Part IV discusses the circuit split as it
currently stands. Part V presents three proposals for resolving the
split and analyzes how closely the proposals adhere to the original
purpose of § 1983 as well as the potential implications of these
proposals on policy concerns. This Note concludes by suggesting
that the Court revisit the issue presented by the Heck circuit split
and clarify that challenges to allegedly unconstitutional
investigatory practices38 should never be barred by Heck.
II. An Overview of Pretrial Diversion Programs
Policy-makers on both sides of the political aisle agree that the
criminal justice system in the United States as currently
constituted is significantly flawed.39 States and the federal system
have instituted various initiatives to address some of these flaws.40
In the United States, the most common alternatives to
imprisonment for non-violent criminal offenders are fines,
probation, and community service.41 In addition to growing trends
Holmberg’s § 1983 claim was Heck-barred.”).
38. See id. at 1250 (dividing § 1983 actions into two categories, one
“involv[ing] suits seeking damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment and the other “for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”).
39. See TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at ix (“There is broad, bipartisan
agreement that the costs of incarceration have far outweighed the benefits, and
that our country has largely failed to meet the goals of a well-functioning justice
system.”).
40. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise
of Specialized Criminal Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 47, 50 (2017) (identifying
the rise in front-end specialized court systems in the federal system since 2013).
41. See Nora V. Demleitner et al., Sentencing Outcomes: Nonprison
Punishments, in SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (5th ed. forthcoming) (outlining the

1770

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1763 (2019)

in assigning alternative sanctions to non-violent offenders,
alternative courts have been established in over 1,500
jurisdictions.42 The most common alternative courts are drug
courts,43 but jurisdictions have also established therapeutic courts,
mental health courts, and community courts.44 Some of these
alternate courts are back-end or reentry programs, meaning that
offenders enter the programs at the termination of their
sentence.45 Others are front-end programs, which substitute an
alternate approach for trial in a traditional court.46 This Note
focuses on front-end programs, which at least temporarily divert
offenders from the criminal justice system. Although the details of
individual diversion program statutes differ by jurisdiction,47 the
programs by definition share an emphasis on avoiding trial. This
Part will provide an overview of the growth of pretrial diversion
programs in the country as well as a brief discussion of the
language used by the implementing statutes to discuss guilt,
conviction, and collateral consequences.
A. Purpose and Prevalence of Pretrial Diversion
In general, pretrial diversion programs “provid[e] an
alternative for prosecution for an individual selected for placement
in a program of supervision.”48 The programs are voluntary and
alternatives to imprisonment commonly implemented based on Bureau of Justice
statistics).
42. See Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://perma.cc/US8G-BF5T (last
visited Sept. 17, 2019) (giving statistics for alternative courts) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. Id.
44. See Demleitner, supra note 41, at 58 (“The broader philosophical and
practical labels used to describe this larger movement are ‘restorative justice’ and
‘therapeutic courts.’”).
45. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 50 (“Most of these courts are drug
courts, and most operate at the back-end of the system as reentry courts.”).
46. See DOJ RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 2 (listing basic differences among
pretrial, prebooking, postbooking, and post-plea diversion programs).
47. See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text (cataloguing various
elements of the pretrial diversion programs considered in this Note).
48. Thomas E. Ulrich, Pretrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, 66
FED. PROB. 30, 30 (2002). See NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES,
PRETRIAL DIVERSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PRETRIAL
DIVERSION PROGRAMS & PRACTICES 6 (2009) [hereinafter NAPSA] (“Pretrial
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are intended, in part, to decrease recidivism by incentivizing
defendants to complete the program rather than face prosecution.49
They are also intended to relieve financial burdens on prison
systems and accomplish additional policy goals such as
rehabilitation and channeling of resources into other kinds of
crime prevention.50 Pretrial diversion programs, both state and
federal, are becoming more prevalent in jurisdictions across the
United States.51 The details of diversion programs vary across
federal districts and states, reflecting the significant role that
prosecutorial discretion plays in the process.52 Because the
diversion is a voluntary option that provides alternative criminal case
processing—preferably resulting in dismissal of the charge—for eligible
defendants.”); CENTER FOR HEALTH AND JUSTICE AT TASC, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 6 (2013) [hereinafter
TASC]
In its most general usage, diversion means that an individual is placed
on a justice track that is less restrictive and affords more opportunities
for rehabilitation and restoration. In its most pure form, diversion may
result in the avoidance or dropping of a charge and dismissal of a case
completely. At either end of the diversion spectrum, the overriding
goals are the same—to maximize the opportunity for success and
minimize the likelihood of recidivism.
49. See Ulrich, supra note 48, at 30 (“Under diversion, the possibility that
prosecution . . . might be suspended is meant to serve as an incentive to
defendants to change their behavior and habits, particularly because it is clear
that prosecution will occur if diversion is not completed successfully.”).
50. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at xi (highlighting potential benefits
of a unified approach to pretrial diversion in the federal system as including
“lower costs, less crime, and a formerly incarcerated population better prepared
to resume life as good neighbors, good parents, and good taxpayers”).
51. See, e.g., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND
DIVERSION-BASED COURT PROGRAMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (2016), https://perma.cc/6V5B-F2PX (PDF) (“The
Smart on Crime initiative, announced by the Department of Justice in August
2013 . . . encouraged federal prosecutors . . . to consider alternatives to
incarceration such as pretrial diversion and diversion-based court programs
where appropriate.”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 49 (“U-ACT [Utah
Alternatives to Conviction Track] is the newest of an increasing number of
‘front-end specialized criminal courts’ operating in the federal system.”). See
generally
Pretrial
Diversion, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
https://perma.cc/47JL-3EQA (last visited Sept. 17, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See James A. Shapiro, Comity of Errors: When Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Ignore State Law Decriminalizing Sentences, 41 AKRON L. REV. 231,
231 (2008) (“Many states have criminal sentences that the United States
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programs vary by jurisdiction, the procedural details also vary. For
example, some programs require a defendant to admit guilt before
entering the program.53 Others require a judicial determination of
guilt, rather than an admission.54 Still others expressly indicate
that the defendant is not admitting guilt.55
Various jurisdictions have designed programs that use the
jurisdiction’s resources as effectively as possible to “generate the
greatest return to communities and taxpayers in terms of cost
savings, public safety, long-term health and personal stability for
justice-involved
populations,
and
overall
community
improvement.”56 A 2013 survey of diversion programs, focusing on
programs that did not result in a conviction on the individual’s
record,57 catalogued 298 programs operating in forty-five states,
Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands.58 The findings
reflected an increase in the number of programs compared to those
recorded by a similar survey in 1979, which found 127 pretrial
diversion programs.59

Sentencing Guidelines . . . refer to as ‘diversionary dispositions.’”); Ulrich, supra
note 48, at 31 (“In the federal court system, the use of diversion varies across
districts, reflecting the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Offices and district
characteristics.”).
53. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.250(1)(f) (West 2019) (“Any person
shall be required to enter an Alford plea or a plea of guilty as a condition of
pretrial diversion.”).
54. See, e.g., Huval v. La. State Univ. Police Dep’t, No. 16-00553-BAJ-RLB,
2018 WL 1095559, at *11, *14 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding that because a
defendant entered a pretrial diversion program “solely at the discretion of the
District Attorney without any endorsement from a court” the program did not
count as an admission or judicial determination of guilt).
55. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2910 (2019) (“No defendant shall be
required to enter any plea to a criminal charge as a condition for diversion.”).
56. TASC, supra note 48, at 1.
57. See id. at 2 (“[T]he distinguishing characteristic for the purposes of this
survey is that the program not result in a conviction on an individual’s record.”).
58. See id. at 17
A national survey conducted in 1979 noted that there were 127 known
pretrial diversion programs. By 2010, the number of known programs
had increased to 298, operating in 45 states, Washington DC, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. [The National Association of Pretrial Services
Agencies] counts, at minimum, 80 diversion laws in place in 45 states.
59. See id. at 17 (discussing a similar survey conducted in 1979).
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Because pretrial diversion programs tend to be
community-based,60 the details and terminology used vary across
jurisdictions.61 According to the National Association of Pretrial
Services Agencies (NAPSA):
Diversion most often includes: alternatives to traditional
criminal justice proceedings for persons charged with criminal
offenses; voluntary participation by the accused; access to
defense counsel prior to a decision to participate; eligibility
throughout the pretrial period (no sooner than the filing of
formal charges and prior to a final adjudication of guilt);
strategies—with input from the accused—to address the needs
of the accused in avoiding behavior likely to lead to future
arrests; and dismissal of charges or its equivalent, if the
divertee successfully completes the diversion process. 62

Regardless of the terminology used, pretrial diversion programs
“tend to be built around local needs, capacity, and partnerships.”63
The goals across jurisdictions include reducing overcrowded prison
populations, reducing costs, and rehabilitative policy initiatives.64
Finally, pretrial diversion programs are designed for, and
admit, only a very small subset of the offender population.
According to the 2013 Treatment Alternatives for Safe
Communities (TASC) survey, “all respondents use a risk
assessment or pre-determined eligibility criteria to identify
appropriate individuals for diversion placement” and most also
have conditions for remaining in and completing the program.65 Of
the almost 300 programs surveyed, nearly all focused on
individuals with behavioral health issues and/or individuals who

60. See id. at 1 (describing pretrial diversion programs as
“community-based”).
61. See id. at 29 (“The language and vocabulary used in discussions of
alternatives to arrest, detainment, conviction, sentencing, or post-sentence
incarceration lacks common definitions and terminologies.”).
62. NAPSA, supra note 48, at 7.
63. TASC, supra note 48, at 29.
64. See id. (“[T]he prevalence of both ‘expediting case disposition’ and
‘increasing diversion options’ as motivators indicates a broader desire to pursue
efficient alternatives, individual rehabilitation, and system reform.”).
65. NAPSA, supra note 48, at 16–17.
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had “explicit eligibility criteria that limited program eligibility for
first-time offenders.”66
B. Survey of the Specific Programs at Issue in the Circuit Split
Although the pretrial diversion programs considered by the
circuit courts vary somewhat, certain key elements remain
consistent. All of the programs considered require the deferral, but
not dismissal, of charges pending successful completion of the
program.67 Many involve both the judge and the prosecutor in a
determination of whether the defendant is a good candidate for the
program, considering factors such as the number of prior offenses
and any history of mental health issues or addiction.68 Of
particular relevance for courts assessing whether participation in
the program constitutes a sentence or conviction sufficient to bar a
future § 1983 action is the question of the defendant’s guilt and
whether the charges against the defendant remain on the record,
are dismissed, or are totally expunged. Because the Heck bar is
explicitly concerned with whether the civil action will implicate an
underlying conviction, both of these conviction-centric elements
naturally play a role in the courts’ assessments.
Interestingly, although the admission or acceptance of guilt by
a defendant might seem to be a logical place to draw a line, a guilty
plea—or lack thereof—is not dispositive to the Heck analysis.
Circuit courts have come to opposite conclusions regardless of any
admission of guilt by the participant-plaintiff. For example, the
Kentucky statute considered in S.E. v. Grant County Board of
Education69 requires either an Alford plea70 or a plea of guilty as a
66. TASC, supra note 48, at 28.
67. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (describing various pretrial
diversion programs).
68. See, e.g., DOJ RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 27, at 1 (surveying the
risk assessments and eligibility criteria used to determine needs of and place
offenders in programs).
69. 544 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008).
70. See Alford Plea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2014) (“A guilty plea that a
defendant enters as part of a plea bargain without admitting guilt.”); see also
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (holding that an accused may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly accept the imposition of a sentence
even if his guilty plea contains a protestation of innocence).
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condition for entering the program.71 The Sixth Circuit considering
that case, however, specified in dicta that Heck would not bar that
defendant’s § 1983 action.72 As demonstrated by Christopher
DeLeon’s case, the Texas diversion statute also required a guilty
plea,73 but the Fifth Circuit explicitly left unanswered the question
of whether successful completion of the program and a subsequent
dismissal of charges would still bar DeLeon’s case under Heck.74
Meanwhile the parallel Kansas statute, which specifies that a
defendant will not be required to enter a plea of any sort as a
condition for entering into the program,75 was an important
rationale for the Tenth Circuit in ruling that Heck does not bar
that plaintiff’s claim.76
Equally important, all pretrial diversion statutes considered
by the circuits mandate that charges be dropped or even
completely expunged following completion of the program.
Kentucky’s program specifies that any charges against the
defendant will be dismissed, and furthermore that participation in
the program “shall not constitute a criminal conviction.”77 The
statute further notes that “pretrial diversion records shall not be
introduced as evidence in any court in a civil, criminal, or other
matter without the consent of the defendant.”78 Kansas’s statute,
however, specifies that participation in a diversion program will
71. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.250(1)(f) (West 2008) (“Any person shall
be required to enter an Alford plea or a plea of guilty as a condition of pretrial
diversion.”).
72. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 639 (“Given the facts of this case, where the
plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineligible, we hold
that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiff’s claims.”).
73. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656 (5th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing that DeLeon had to sign a sworn confession and plead either guilty
or nolo contendere in order to be eligible for the diversion program).
74. See id. (“This case does not require that we decide whether a successfully
completed deferred adjudication, with its more limited collateral consequences
under Texas law, is also a conviction for the purposes of Heck.”).
75. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2910 (2009) (“No defendant shall be required to
enter any plea to a criminal charge as a condition for diversion.”).
76. See Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting the district court’s determination that the program constituted a
judgment of criminal guilt).
77. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.258(1) (West 2008).
78. Id. § 533.258(3).
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not be admissible in evidence in future criminal proceedings.79
Kansas also requires that all criminal charges be dismissed with
prejudice,80 while Florida dismisses charges without prejudice.81 In
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, charges are dismissed and erased82
or dismissed and expunged83 following completion of the program.
As described above, pretrial diversion programs at the state
level include a variety of different steps and requirements for
participants to satisfy before being released from the system.
Despite these differences, each of these programs is intended to
provide an alternative to the trial court procedures for certain
individuals who are eligible and selected to participate. However,
depending on where an alleged offender lives when he or she
agrees to enter a pretrial diversion program, there may be certain
collateral consequences attached that may not be immediately
apparent either to the offender or to his or her attorney. In
particular, a person who decides to enter a pretrial diversion
program may lose his or her opportunity to sue for monetary
damages under the civil rights statute known as Section 1983. The
next Part will explore the Section 1983 statue and its intersection
with a similar statute, the federal habeas corpus act, as well as the
development of the Heck doctrine.

79. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2910 (2009) (“[T]he following shall not be
admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings . . . : (1) Participation in a
diversion program; (2) the facts of such participation; or (3) the diversion
agreement entered into.”).
80. See id. § 22-2909(a) (“A diversion agreement shall provide that if the
defendant fulfills the obligations of the program . . . [the state] shall act to have
the criminal charges against the defendant dismissed with prejudice.”).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 948.08(5)(c) (2007) (“[D]ismissal of charges without
prejudice shall be entered in instances in which prosecution is not deemed
necessary.”).
82. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56e(f) (1992) (“If a defendant . . . satisfactorily
completes such defendant’s period of probation, such defendant may apply for
dismissal of the charges . . . . Upon dismissal, all records of such charges shall be
erased.”).
83. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 319, 320 (2005) (“When the defendant shall have
completed satisfactorily the program prescribed . . . the defendant may move the
court for an order dismissing the charges.”).
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III. The Emergence of the Heck Doctrine
The Heck doctrine developed out of the interaction of two
Reconstruction Era statutes, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254)84 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1983).85 The former authorizes state
prisoners to petition federal courts to grant a writ of habeas corpus,
a means to verify the legality of a person’s imprisonment.86 The
latter provides a cause of action for individuals to sue for money
damages if their civil rights are violated.87 Following the passage
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), additional limitations were placed on the habeas
process.88 The language of these statutes, as well as the Supreme
Court’s subsequent interpretation,89 creates an intersection of
sorts for prisoners challenging the legality of their convictions.90
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.”).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018)
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
86. See Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A writ
employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the
person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”). See generally WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980).
87. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (discussing the legislative
history and purpose of the Civil Rights Act that gave rise to § 1983).
88. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Larry W. Yackle, A
Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 318, 386–93 (1996)
(discussing modifications to exhaustion requirements and other limitations
following passage of the Act).
89. See infra Part III.C (discussing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973),
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), and
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)).
90. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994)
This case lies at the intersection of the two most fertile sources of
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A. Enactment and Purpose of Section 1983

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for any person deprived
of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” by a person acting “under the color of” state
law.91 Generally, the statute is intended to protect individuals
against an inappropriate use of state power.92 The Supreme Court
has several times delved into the legislative history behind the
statute’s enactment in order to determine its legislative purpose.
In Monroe v. Pape,93 the Court explained that “[i]t was not the
unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to
enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful
momentum behind this force bill.”94 Claims brought under § 1983
that are based on a state actor allegedly violating an individual’s
civil rights—i.e. a state failing to enforce a constitutional
right—are therefore a perfect example of how the statute functions
as intended.
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the intended reach of
the statute. The Court suggested a broad reading of the statute in
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.95 by highlighting the
historical context of the enactment.96 The Court explained that
federal-court prisoner litigation—the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . and
the federal habeas corpus statute. Both of these provide access to a
federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of
state officials.
See also Lyndon Bradshaw, Comment, The Heck Conundrum: Why Federal
Courts Should Not Overextend the Heck v. Humphrey Preclusion Doctrine, 2014
BYU L. REV. 185, 207 (2014) (identifying the functioning of the doctrines as
overlapping circles, or, alternately, as the intersection between “§ 1983 Street”
and “Habeas Street”).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
92. See Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 n.8 (9th Cir. 1973)
As the debates at the time disclose, Congress sought to effectuate three
purposes in enacting § 1983: (1) to override certain kinds of state laws;
(2) to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate; and (3) to
afford a federal remedy where the state remedy, while adequate in
theory, was not available in practice.
See generally 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 64 (2018).
93. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
94. Id. at 174–75.
95. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
96. See id. at 258 (“It is by now well settled that the tort liability created
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“members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law
principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary
tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law
principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.”97
The Court then reiterated this broad reading of the statute’s
application in Briscoe v. LaHue,98 acknowledging that “it has been
settled that the all-encompassing language of § 1983 . . . is not to
be taken literally.”99 Then, in Kalina v. Fletcher,100 the Court
compared the § 1983 cause of action to prior common law
principles: “The coverage of the statute is thus broader than the
pre-existing common law of torts. We have nevertheless recognized
that Congress intended the statute to be construed in the light of
common-law principles that were well settled at the time of its
enactment.”101
Two broad themes thus emerge from the Court’s
interpretation of § 1983. The first is that Congress intended the
statute to be read broadly, to protect individuals when the state
has acted improperly or failed to act to protect constitutional
rights.102 The second theme is that while common law provides a
basis for interpreting § 1983, common law is not coequal with the
statute. Both of these themes come up in the Court’s jurisprudence
in the line of cases that includes Heck.103

by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.”).
97. Id.
98. 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
99. Id. at 330.
100. 522 U.S. 118 (1997).
101. Id. at 123.
102. Of course, even if the statute is theoretically available to a large swath
of individuals, few plaintiffs ever get past the doctrine of qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citation omitted)).
103. See infra notes 134–193 and accompanying text (tracing these two
themes).
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B. Enactment and Purpose of Federal Habeas Corpus

The other statute that repeatedly appears in the Heck
jurisprudence is the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.104
The intersection of Section 1983 with the habeas statute, and
particularly the way the two statutes function as resources for
individuals challenging the state, illuminates the debate around
the Heck doctrine in the lower courts. Of particular relevance, the
federal habeas statute requires that a state prisoner exhaust all
state remedies before bringing a claim under the statute,105 one of
the major justifications given by the Court when developing the
Heck doctrine.106
The Supreme Court took up the question of the availability of
the federal habeas statute to state prisoners in several cases in the
1960s and 1970s. In Fay v. Noia,107 Justice Brennan surveyed the
history of the writ of habeas corpus as part of an inquiry into the
boundaries of the federal and state systems of criminal justice. 108
He noted that “[i]ts root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a
man’s imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual
is entitled to his immediate release.”109 Arguing for a broad
interpretation of federal court jurisdiction in habeas petitions,
Justice Brennan summarized the history of the statute by
declaring that “Congress in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum
for state prisoners having constitutional defenses by extending the
habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their constitutional
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018). See infra Part III.C.1–4 (discussing the
development of the Heck doctrine in part to monitor the intersection of the habeas
statute with § 1983).
105. See § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ . . . shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State.”).
106. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the justifications for the development
of the Heck bar, including that prisoners not be allowed to evade the exhaustion
requirements of the habeas statute by instituting a § 1983 suit instead).
107. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
108. See id. at 399–426 (tracing the development of the writ of habeas corpus
from its origins in seventeenth-century English jurisprudence through the
then-present).
109. Id. at 402.
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maximum.”110 Under this approach, a court might be more inclined
than not to err on the side of allowing state prisoners to collaterally
attack a conviction if there were any reasonable claim of
unconstitutionality.
Notably, however, Justice Brennan’s equitable view of the
habeas statute did not go unquestioned, even decades before
AEDPA legislation passed. Justice Clark’s dissent in Fay pointed
out the significant effect this view of habeas has on both judicial
efficiency111 and the administration of justice.112 A decade later, in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,113 Justice Powell took up the
question.114 Justice Powell characterized Justice Brennan’s view in
Fay as “a revisionist view of the historic function that writ was
meant to perform,”115 arguing instead that “recent scholarship has
cast grave doubt on Fay’s version of the writ’s historic function.”116
As a result, Justice Powell pointed out that the writ of habeas
corpus was then afforded an unreasonably “wide scope,” having
little to do with its “historic, common-law development.”117 While
110. Id. at 426. The case concerned a prisoner, Charles Noia, who was
convicted of felony murder along with two codefendants. Id. at 394. All three were
convicted on the basis of confessions later found to have been coerced. Id. at 395.
Noia’s two codefendants were released, but Noia failed to timely appeal and was
then barred from filing a federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state
remedies. Id. at 398. Justice Brennan pointed out that while federal habeas
jurisdiction must be limited, the intent of the habeas statute requires equitable
treatment of “persons whom society has grievously wronged.” Id. at 441.
Furthermore, “[i]f the States withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have
the power and the duty to provide it.” Id.
111. See id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[T]here can be no question but that
a rash of new applications from state prisoners will pour into the federal courts,
and 98% of them will be frivolous, if history is any guide.”).
112. See id. (“After today state judgments will be relegated to a judicial limbo,
subject to federal collateral attack—as here—a score of years later despite a
defendant’s willful failure to appeal.”).
113. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
114. See id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring) (“While I join the opinion of the
Court, it does not address what seems to me the overriding issue briefed and
argued in this case: the extent to which federal habeas corpus should be available
to a state prisoner seeking to exclude evidence from an allegedly unlawful search
and seizure.”).
115. Id. at 252.
116. Id. at 253.
117. Id.
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Justice Powell agreed that the writ functions as an important
guardian of liberty for individuals,118 the broad reading established
in Fay was, in his view, an “unprecedented extension . . . far
beyond its historic bounds and in disregard of the writ’s central
purpose.”119 Justice Powell also addressed whether a petitioner’s
guilt or innocence should be a factor in whether a court may hear
the petition,120 arguing that because guilt is rarely at issue in
Fourth Amendment claims, federal habeas should not be
available.121 The costs of such broad interpretation, Justice Powell
argued, are far too high, given that the cases coming before the
courts are no longer about guilt or innocence, but rather about
procedural defaults in earlier postures.122 Here, one begins to see
the contraction of the Court’s interpretation of collateral attacks
and the glimmerings of the guilt-or-innocence question that the
Court will take up in the Heck line of cases.123
118. See id. at 256 (“Habeas corpus indeed should provide the added
assurance for a free society that no innocent man suffers an unconstitutional loss
of liberty.”).
119. Id. at 259.
120. See id. at 258 (“I am aware that history reveals no exact tie of the writ of
habeas corpus to a constitutional claim relating to innocence or guilt.
Traditionally, the writ was unavailable even for many constitutional pleas
grounded on a claimant’s innocence . . . .”).
121. See id. (“Prisoners raising Fourth Amendment claims collaterally
usually are quite justly detained. . . . Rarely is there any contention that the
search rendered the evidence unreliable or that its means cast doubt upon the
prisoner’s guilt.”).
122. See id. at 274
If these consequences flowed from the safeguarding of constitutional
claims of innocence they should, of course, be accepted as a tolerable
price to pay for cherished standards of justice at the same time that
efforts are pursued to find more rational procedures. Yet, as illustrated
by the case before us today, the question on habeas corpus is too rarely
whether the prisoner was innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted and too frequently whether some evidence of undoubted
probative value has been admitted in violation of an exclusionary rule
ritualistically applied.
123. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the Court’s opinion in Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). Preiser, handed down just three weeks prior to
Schneckloth, held that a state prisoner challenging the duration of his
confinement may only bring an action under the federal habeas statute and not
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall dissented in both cases. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Regrettably,
the Court today . . . [draws] a distinction that is both analytically unsound and I
fear, unworkable in practice.”); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J.,
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The Court’s interpretation of the reach of the habeas statute
continued to contract following Schneckloth. In later
jurisprudence, the Court continued to emphasize the importance
of preventing constant re-litigation of well-settled claims in the
context of collateral attacks under the habeas statute. In 1990, in
affirming a denial of a federal habeas petition in the Eighth
Amendment context, the Court reaffirmed that “the purpose of
federal habeas corpus is to ensure that state convictions comply
with the federal law in existence at the time the conviction became
final, and not to provide a mechanism for the continuing
reexamination of final judgments based upon later emerging legal
doctrine.”124 Following the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, the Court
again pointed out that finality of judgment played a role in the
legislative and judicial considerations driving the criminal justice
system. In Rhines v. Weber,125 for example, the Court explained
that “AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period ‘quite plainly serves the
well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments.’ It
‘reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality by restricting
the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which
to seek federal habeas review.’”126 Two years earlier, the Court had
reasoned that Congress intended “to further the principles of
comity, finality, and federalism” by enacting AEDPA.127 Thus,
while the Court generally interprets § 1983 broadly, the Court’s
interpretation of the habeas statute has contracted over time,
especially following the passage of AEDPA. Nonetheless, the two
statutes continue to overlap, as seen in the development of the
Court’s Heck jurisprudence.

dissenting) (“It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to
have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever
being aware of its existence. . . . I respectfully dissent.”).
124. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990).
125. 54 U.S. 269 (2005).
126. Id. at 276 (citing Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)).
127. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)).
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C. Tracing the Supreme Court’s Heck Jurisprudence

The Heck doctrine springs in part from the two statutes just
discussed. In his majority opinion in Heck, Justice Scalia discussed
the intersection of the § 1983 statute and the federal habeas
statute.128 Justice Scalia at first seemed to be following the Court’s
precedent in Preiser v. Rodriguez,129 which explicates where
habeas leaves off and § 1983 begins.130 However, Justice Scalia
eventually dismissed that line of reasoning and instead turned to
tort law, comparing a § 1983 claim to an action for malicious
prosecution.131 In Justice Scalia’s view, the malicious prosecution
line of reasoning was a closer analogy to the § 1983 statute.132 In
some ways, the Justice’s reasoning did pick up on some of the
common law underpinnings of the § 1983 statute.133 However,
lower courts have recognized two alternate rationales from the
Heck majority, and confusion over how to interpret Heck runs
rampant.134 The reasoning used by the circuit courts in the pretrial
128. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (rejecting the idea that
Roy Heck’s case could be solved under the rubric established in Preiser to
differentiate between the two statutes).
129. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
130. See infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text (analyzing Preiser).
131. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 (“The common-law cause of action for malicious
prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here.”).
132. See id. (“[P]etitioner seeks not immediate or speedier release, but
monetary damages, as to which he could not ‘have sought and obtained fully
effective relief through federal habeas corpus proceedings.’” (quoting Preiser, 411
U.S. at 494)).
133. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text (identifying the common
law elements from which § 1983 developed).
134. See, e.g., DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir.
2007) (“Heck’s favorable termination doctrine is supported by two
somewhat-independent rationales, which divide the Court and circuits even
today.” (citations omitted)); Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 187 (identifying a circuit
split over whether the Heck doctrine applies to bar a co-felon’s civil rights suit);
Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121
HARV. L. REV. 868, 868 (2008) [hereinafter Defining the Reach] (identifying lower
court confusion on the question of whether state prisoners ineligible for habeas
relief have access to § 1983); Eric J. Savoy, Comment, Heck v. Humphrey: What
Should State Prisoners Use When Seeking Damages from State Officials, Section
1983 or Federal Habeas Corpus?, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
109, 138 (1996) (“[T]he anticipated Supreme Court case [Heck] has made a
complex area of the law even more complicated.”).
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diversion context is a direct consequence of the two rationales of
Heck as interpreted in conjunction with the entire line of cases that
discuss when and how a plaintiff is eligible to bring a § 1983 claim.
1. An Initial Approach: Habeas Is the Proper Remedy to Obtain
Release
In Preiser v. Rodriguez,135 state prisoners brought a § 1983
action against the New York State Department of Correctional
Services alleging unconstitutional deprivation of “good-time”
credits during their confinement.136 Restoring the credits would
result in each prisoner’s release from prison.137 At issue in the case
was whether the prisoners could sue under § 1983, rather than
petitioning under the habeas statute.138 As the Court noted, the
issue was one “of considerable practical importance. For if a
remedy under the Civil Rights Act is available, a plaintiff need not
first seek redress in a state forum.”139 In other words, the
opportunity to choose a civil rights action under § 1983 instead of
bringing a habeas petition would allow a plaintiff to avoid the
exhaustion requirements of the habeas statute, thus frustrating
the intent of Congress.140 To assess the reasonableness of the
claim, the Court examined both statutes, identifying that “the
problem involves the interrelationship of two important federal
laws.”141 In addition to probing congressional intent,142 the Court
discussed the history of habeas proceedings as a means to secure
135. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
136. Id. at 476.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 477 (“The question before us is whether state prisoners seeking
such redress may obtain equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act, even though
the federal habeas corpus statute . . . clearly provides a specific federal remedy.”).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 489 (“In amending the habeas corpus laws in 1948, Congress
clearly required exhaustion of adequate state remedies as a condition precedent
to the invocation of federal judicial relief under those laws.”).
141. Id. at 483.
142. See id. at 489 (suggesting that the broad language of § 1983 does not
necessarily mean Congress intended it to be literally applicable to all possible
plaintiffs).
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release from unlawful physical confinement.143 Ultimately the
Court held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact
or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is
a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy
is a writ of habeas corpus.”144 The Preiser case thus laid the
groundwork for later discussions of the intersection of § 1983 with
the habeas statute. Indeed, that question was one the Court
explicitly took up in its next foray into the issue in Heck.
2. The Heck Doctrine Takes Shape
The issue before the Court in Heck v. Humphrey was “whether
a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his
conviction in a suit for damages under [§ 1983].”145 The petitioner,
Roy Heck, was serving a fifteen year sentence for voluntary
manslaughter of his wife. Heck alleged that prosecutors in his case
had violated his constitutional rights by engaging in various
unlawful investigation practices.146 Importantly, Heck’s complaint
sought only money damages, not injunctive relief or release from
custody.147 Under Preiser, therefore, his case did not fall within the
boundaries of the federal habeas statute.
Justice Scalia’s majority decision immediately pointed to the
preceding decision in Preiser, revisiting its assertion that “habeas
corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges
the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim
may come within the literal terms of § 1983.”148 He then noted that
the issue for Heck was not about confinement at all but rather
monetary damages, therefore bringing the case outside of Preiser’s

143. See id. at 485 (“[O]ver the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a
remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the
Constitution or fundamental law.”).
144. Id. at 500.
145. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994).
146. See id. at 479 (alleging arbitrary investigation procedures, destruction of
evidence, and use of an unlawful “voice identification procedure”).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 481.
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holding.149 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia noted that two dicta points
in Preiser needed clarification. The first, suggesting that “a
damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under § 1983
in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of
state remedies,” failed to take into account actions that would
challenge the validity of the claimant’s underlying conviction.150
Once a claim challenged an underlying conviction, the second
dictum came into play, namely that state prisoners “attacking the
validity of the fact or length of their confinement” must use the
habeas statute.151 From there, however, Justice Scalia moved away
from the consideration of the two statutes, instead turning to
consider a completely different rationale for answering the
question before the Court. Since the Court had previously
compared § 1983 to tort liability, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
common law would provide better guidance.152 The “closest
analogy,” he found, was the tort of malicious prosecution, which
“permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal
process.”153 From there, the majority opinion reviewed the history
of malicious prosecution and identified a key element in a cause of
action for malicious prosecution: proof that the underlying
criminal proceeding terminated in the would-be plaintiff’s favor.154
Following this analogy and rationale, the Supreme Court held that
“a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged . . . declared
invalid . . . or called into question by a . . . writ of habeas corpus”
in order to bring a suit for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment.155
As far as the Heck majority opinion goes, the holding was quite
clear. However, Justice Souter’s concurrence complicated the issue
149. See id. (“This case is clearly not covered by the holding of Preiser.”).
150. Id. at 481–82.
151. Id. at 482.
152. See id. at 483 (“Thus, to determine whether there is any bar to the
present suit, we look first to the common law of torts.”).
153. Id. at 484.
154. See id. (“This requirement avoids parallel litigation . . . and precludes the
possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been
convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.”).
155. Id. at 486–87.
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by more closely examining the ways in which the habeas statute
and § 1983 interact.156 Justice Souter picked up on the second
rationale of the majority opinion and offered it as a clearer
standard.157 He pointed out the oddities in using a common law
analogy to resolve a statutory question when there were other
possible means to resolve the issue.158 He also disagreed with the
decision to rely entirely on common law analogies, noting that
“ordinary rules of statutory interpretation” should not be so
completely set aside.159 While the common law provided a useful
aid in the inquiry, Justice Souter found that the methodology of
Preiser would be more effective.160 Therefore, the Justice suggested
an alternative: “A state prisoner may seek federal-court § 1983
damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement, but only
if he has previously established the unlawfulness of his conviction
or confinement, as on appeal or on habeas.”161 Indeed, Justice
Souter pointed out that the majority opinion could be read to say
exactly that much and no more.162 His fear was that, under an
alternate reading, the holding “would needlessly place at risk the
rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas
statute, individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes.”163
Indeed, as Justice Souter feared, lower courts immediately
struggled to reconcile the majority’s holding with the realities of

156. See id. at 491–92 (Souter, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority’s
decision to begin by noting the interaction of the two statutes, but also criticizing
the majority for not following the path further).
157. See id. at 498 (“A state prisoner may seek federal-court § 1983 damages
for unconstitutional conviction or confinement, but only if he has previously
established the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, as on appeal or on
habeas.”).
158. See id. at 492–96 (pointing out that the Court traditionally relies on
common law only when other statutory interpretation principles fail; that the
majority ignores other aspects of malicious prosecution; and that any definition
of “favorable termination” at the time of the statute’s enactment would have been
vastly different than modern-day interpretations).
159. Id. at 492.
160. See id. at 497 (“Though in contrast to Preiser the state prisoner here
seeks damages, not release from custody, the distinction makes no difference
when the damages sought are for unconstitutional conviction or confinement.”).
161. Id. at 498.
162. Id. at 500.
163. Id.
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cases arriving in the lower courts, and the Court was asked to
revisit the issue just four years later in Spencer v. Kenma.164
3. A Split Court Revisits Heck
The Court nuanced the discussion of the intersection between
habeas and § 1983 in its 1998 decision in Spencer. There, petitioner
Randy Spencer had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
invalidate an order revoking his parole.165 The petition alleged a
violation of due process.166 Although six months remained on his
sentence when the claim was initially brought,167 Spencer was no
longer imprisoned by the time the district court got around to his
case.168 The issue before the Supreme Court was “whether
petitioner’s subsequent release caused the petition to be moot
because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article
III, § 2, of the Constitution.”169 Spencer’s argument (as
characterized by Justice Scalia) was that because Heck would bar
his § 1983 claim unless he could demonstrate that the underlying
conviction (here, his parole revocation) was invalid, the action to
invalidate his parole revocation could not be moot.170 In other
words, the fact that Spencer wanted to sue for damages under
§ 1983 should be enough to imbue his habeas suit with controversy
and thereby give him standing. Justice Scalia, unimpressed, called
Spencer’s Heck argument “a great non sequitur.”171
Justice Souter, however, wrote a concurring opinion in which
he joined the Court’s opinion but elaborated on the intersection of

164. 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
165. See id. at 3–4 (describing Spencer’s alleged violations of his parole
conditions and his subsequent efforts to invalidate the order of revocation).
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 6. As the Court notes, Spencer had returned to prison by the time
his case reached the Supreme Court. See id. at 6 n.2 (“By the time the [instant]
case reached the Eighth Circuit, petitioner was once again in prison, this time
serving a 7-year sentence for attempted felony stealing. He is still there . . . .”).
169. Id. at 7.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Id.
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§ 1983 and the federal habeas statute.172 In fact, much of the
opinion revisited ground already laid out in the Heck concurrence,
with Justice Souter explaining that his rationale in Heck was
equally applicable to Spencer’s case.173 Justice Souter concluded
that “[t]he better view, then, is that a former prisoner, no longer
‘in custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being
bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would
be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.”174 In Justice
Souter’s reasoning, therefore, whenever the federal habeas statute
is not available to those not in custody, § 1983 should be, in order
to satisfy both congressional intent and policy considerations.175
Unfortunately for the lower courts, Spencer did little to clarify
the boundaries of the Heck doctrine. While Spencer’s majority
opinion was joined by eight of the nine Justices,176 the majority did
not directly address the question of whether the Heck doctrine
barred Spencer’s suit.177 At the same time, Justice Souter’s
concurrence was joined by three other Justices,178 and Justice
Stevens agreed with its rationale in his dissent.179 Therefore five
Justices had arguably endorsed an alternate rationale for
resolving the Heck bar, one in which the availability of a recourse

172. Id. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 19–21 (reitrating his Heck rationale and applying his preferred
holding to the new context).
174. Id. at 21.
175. See id. at 20 (“I also thought we were bound to recognize the apparent
scope of § 1983 when no limitation was required for the sake of honoring some
other statute or weighty policy.”). Justice Souter’s opinion picked up on at least
one additional policy issue left unmentioned by the court: that an individual
arguably should not lose access to a civil rights action for unconstitutional
treatment by the state simply because that individual served his or her sentence.
Such an individual might have an ever greater interest in pursuing justice if he
or she had already undergone an allegedly unjust punishment.
176. See id. at 2 (listing all but Justice Stevens joining the majority).
177. See id. at 17 (foreclosing Spencer’s Heck argument as “a great non
sequitur”).
178. See id. at 18 (listing Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer as joining
Justice Souter’s concurrence).
179. See id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given the Court’s holding that
petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear,
as Justice Souter explains, that he may bring an action under § 1983.”).
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under habeas was the primary determination of whether an
individual could bring suit under § 1983.
4. Future Convictions Exempted from Heck
The Court’s most recent addition to Heck jurisprudence came
in 2007 in Wallace v. Kato.180 Petitioner Andre Wallace filed a
§ 1983 action against arresting officers for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.181 Wallace was arrested in 1994 in an investigation
for the murder of a Chicago man, John Handy.182 Wallace, then
fifteen years old, admitted to the murder during a police
interrogation and signed a written confession.183 He was convicted
and sentenced to twenty-six years in prison.184 The appellate court
remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that his statements
after his arrest were not admissible,185 and eight years after the
arrest, prosecutors dropped the charges.186 The issue before the
Court was whether Wallace’s § 1983 suit was timely, since under
Illinois law Wallace only had two years to file his § 1983 suit.187
The Court therefore had to determine whether the two year clock
began at the time of Wallace’s arrest, or whether it began on the
date on which the petitioner’s conviction was vacated. Although
the case was resolved on other grounds,188 the Heck-specific issue
in Wallace was whether the petitioner’s § 1983 action, which had
been barred under Heck while he was incarcerated, would be
180. 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
181. See id. at 386 n.1 (describing the suit as seeking damages arising from
his unlawful arrest, as well as some additional claims not before the court).
182. Id. at 386.
183. See id. (“After interrogations that lasted into the early morning hours
the next day, petitioner agreed to confess to Handy’s murder.”).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 387.
186. See id. at 386–87 (“On January 17, 1994, John Handy was shot to
death . . . [T]wo days later, Chicago police officers located petitioner . . . . On April
10, 2002, prosecutors dropped the charges against petitioner.”).
187. See id. at 387 (explaining that the statute of limitations for filing a
federal § 1983 claim is based on the length of time the state provides for filing a
personal injury tort—two years, in Illinois).
188. See id. at 391 (relying on state tolling law and common law to resolve
Wallace’s case).
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outside the statute of limitations once that conviction was later
vacated.189 In another opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court
suggested that “[a]spects of § 1983 which are not governed by
reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in
general to common-law tort principles.”190 The Court then held
that “the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking
damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run
at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal
process.”191 In other words, Wallace was out of luck. However,
Justice Scalia also wrote that an expansion of the Heck bar to
“impugn an anticipated future conviction” would be pushing the
doctrine too far.192 “The impracticality of such a rule should be
obvious.”193 Under Justice Scalia’s view, the Heck bar could not be
extended to cover anticipated convictions, only reasonably
contemplated ones. In the context of pretrial diversion, such an
approach might be particularly relevant, because in the majority
of pretrial diversion programs there is no conviction.194 Conviction
is a possibility, but not necessarily a likelihood.
Although the bulk of the Heck doctrine is contained in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinions in Heck and Spencer and in Justice
Souter’s concurrences in both cases, important elements stem from
Preiser and Wallace as well. Preiser outlined the primary policy
rationale underlying the Heck doctrine: that plaintiffs should not
be able to use § 1983 to avoid the exhaustion requirements of the
habeas statute.195 Wallace added the question of anticipated future
convictions to the conversation.196 Both themes, as well as the two
competing rationales of Heck and Spencer, reappear in the cases
decided in the circuit split, which will be discussed in the next Part.
189. See id. at 394 (“[I]t raises the question whether, assuming that the Heck
bar takes effect when the later conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations
on the once valid cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar subsists.”).
190. Id. at 388.
191. Id. at 397.
192. Id. at 393.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (describing the guilt and
conviction aspects of certain pretrial diversion programs).
195. Supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
196. Supra notes 192–193 and accompanying text.
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IV. Ongoing Circuit Split on Pretrial Diversion Programs
Under Heck
Following the Supreme Court’s establishment of the Heck bar
in 1994, lower courts have struggled to identify what constitutes a
prior conviction for the purposes of the doctrine.197 Many note the
competing rationales espoused within Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion, which discussed the precedent established in Preiser, the
tort of malicious prosecution, and the exhaustion of state
remedies.198 This Part will discuss the circuit split that currently
exists as to whether participation in a pretrial diversion program
bars an individual from bringing a later civil rights action under
§ 1983 for an incident stemming from the same act.

197. Recently, a Maryland federal district court followed the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit in DeLeon in holding that participation in Maryland’s pretrial
probation program barred a § 1983 claim. See Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp.
3d 366, 379 (D. Md. 2018) (“Although a PBJ [probation before judgment]
disposition . . . does not result in a formal conviction or judgment . . . it is, like a
Texas deferred adjudication, a final judicial act. . . . More importantly, a PBJ, by
statute, necessarily comes after a finding of guilt.”). But the question of whether
prior proceedings should count as a “conviction” also implicates no contest pleas,
disciplinary convictions, and lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cty. of
Pima, 913 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiff could not recover
damages under § 1983 for wrongful incarceration when his original arson
convictions were vacated and he pled no contest to the same charges, was
sentenced to time served, and was immediately released from prison); Bourne v.
Gunnes, 921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s
determination that a prisoner’s excessive force claims would “implicate the
validity of his disciplinary conviction for creating the disturbance that resulted in
the use of force”); Dennis v. City of Phila., 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(concluding that Heck did not bar a § 1983 suit by a prisoner who had first
obtained federal habeas relief and then pled no contest to a lesser-included
offense); Maloley v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 931 N.W.2d 139,
146 (Neb. 2019) (rejecting the argument that Heck should not bar constitutional
due process claims that preceded trespass convictions).
198. See, e.g., DeLeon v. Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 654 n.22 (5th Cir. 2007)
(comparing the majority opinions in Heck and Spencer to the concurrence of
Justice Souter in Heck and the opinions of Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens
in Spencer to support the proposition that both the Court and the circuits are
divided). See also supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text (discussing the
Heck opinion).
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A. In Three Circuits, Pretrial Diversion Does Not Trigger
the Heck Bar
In the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, participation in a
pretrial diversion program does not constitute a conviction for
purposes of the Heck doctrine, regardless of the specifics of the
program. The clearest assessment of why pretrial diversion should
not be considered a conviction for purposes of the Heck doctrine
comes out of the Eleventh Circuit.
1. No Conviction, No Heck Bar
The Eleventh Circuit suggested several reasons a pretrial
diversion program should not trigger the Heck bar in McClish v.
Nugent.199 Following various altercations with the police in 2001,
Edmund Holmberg was arrested for resisting a police officer.200 He
was admitted to and completed a pretrial intervention program,
after which the charge against him was dismissed.201 Holmberg
then brought a § 1983 suit against the arresting officers in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
alleging unlawful arrest, harassment, and knowingly using false
testimony in preparing an affidavit.202 The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that Holmberg’s
wrongful arrest claim was barred by Heck because of his prior
participation in the pretrial diversion program.203
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the issue by
exploring the rationale behind Heck, noting that the Heck bar was
designed “to avoid the problem inherent in two potentially
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same set of events by
199. 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007).
200. See id. at 1236 (describing the arrest of Holmberg after police officers
arrived at his home and arrested his co-defendant Douglas McClish).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See McClish v. Nugent, No. 8:04-CV-2723-T-24TGW, 2006 WL 8440092,
at *1, *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2006) (“[T]he Court concludes that Holmberg’s
participation in PTI, which resulted in a dismissal of the charge of resisting arrest
without violence, is not a termination in his favor, and therefore, he is barred
from bringing a § 1983 claim for false arrest.”); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1233 (citing
the same language from the district court).
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foreclosing collateral attacks on convictions through the vehicle of
a § 1983 suit.”204 The court then wrestled with the Heck and
Spencer dichotomy, finding that Spencer suggested that § 1983
claims are only barred when habeas is available.205 The court
articulated two kinds of potential challenges that would give rise
to Heck issues: challenges to the judgment (the conviction itself)206
and challenges to procedures (tbe steps leading to the arrest or
conviction).207 This division between types of challenges might be
better characterized as a split between challenges to adjudicative
procedures and challenges to investigatory procedures. Based on
this articulation, the court reasoned that because the defendant
was never convicted, he therefore could not fall within either
category of Heck conflicts.208 As a result, the facts of his case would
not even implicate the question of whether a pretrial diversion
program constitutes a conviction. Instead, the court said, while
pretrial diversion may not be a favorable termination, it is also not
a conviction or a sentence.209
McClish also adopted the rationale of Wallace on the question
of future convictions. The court reasoned that, under Wallace,
“Heck only comes into play when there has been an outstanding
criminal judgment or extant conviction, [and] Heck was not raised
when there was in existence no criminal conviction that the cause
of action would impugn.”210 The would-be plaintiff, Holmberg,
would by definition never be convicted because his case was
already resolved through his entry into, and completion of, the
204. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1250.
205. See id. at 1251 n.19 (citing a prior decision in which a panel of the
Eleventh Circuit relied on Spencer for the proposition that § 1983 claims were
only barred when habeas relief remained available).
206. See id. at 1250 (“The primary category of cases barred by Heck involved
suits seeking damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment.”).
207. See id. (identifying a second category of cases involving suits to recover
damages “for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid” (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486
(1994))).
208. Id. at 1251.
209. See id. (“[T]he question is . . . whether Heck applies at all since Holmberg
was never convicted of any crime.”).
210. McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
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pretrial diversion program.211 Therefore, “to dismiss this § 1983
claim as barred by Heck because of a potential conflict that we
know now with certainty will never materialize would stretch Heck
beyond the limits of its reasoning.”212 Ultimately the court decided
that based on these precedents, Holmberg’s pretrial diversion was
not a conviction necessitating the use of the Heck bar.
2. No Guilt, No Heck Bar
The Tenth Circuit took a slightly different approach, focusing
on the would-be plaintiff’s guilt rather than on a conviction. In
Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks213 the defendant, Martin Vasquez Arroyo,
filed two pro se § 1983 actions in the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas alleging false arrest and the forging of
his signatures on pretrial diversion agreements.214 The district
court dismissed the claims, finding them barred by Heck.215 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit specifically asked for briefing and
argument as to “whether the Heck v. Humphrey bar applies to a
Kansas pre-trial diversion agreement.”216 The court also asked the
parties to address the question of “whether Heck v. Humphrey
applies when the plaintiff lacks an available remedy in habeas, in
light of the circuit split on this issue.”217
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit first reviewed the
rationale behind Heck, highlighting the intersection of the habeas
statute with the § 1983 statute.218 In particular, the Tenth Circuit
211. See Conviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The act or
process of finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved
guilty.”).
212. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1252 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)).
213. 589 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2009).
214. See id. at 1092 (describing Vasquez’s allegations, filed in December 2007
and January 2008 against three different state authorities).
215. See Vasquez v. Starks, No. 07-3298-SAC, 2008 WL 11429983, at *1, *3
(D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2008) (“The court concludes the diversion agreement in question
is sufficiently analogous to a finding in a criminal action that it is reasonable to
impose the Heck bar.”).
216. Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1093.
217. Id.
218. See id. (asserting that all nine Justices agreed that the key question in
Heck was the intersection of habeas with § 1983).
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cited its own precedent for the proposition that “the purpose
behind Heck is to prevent litigants from using a § 1983 action, with
its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their conviction or
sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion
requirements for habeas actions.”219 The court then looked at the
language of Kansas’s pretrial diversion statute which stated that
“diversion is . . . a means to avoid a judgment of criminal guilt.”220
Making a key determination, the court characterized this language
as “the opposite of a conviction in a criminal action.”221 To support
this reading, the court interpreted Wallace to mean that the Heck
bar only applies “when there is an actual conviction, not an
anticipated one.”222 Because Vasquez Arroyo was not adjudged
guilty, and Heck does not, under Wallace, bar claims purely to
protect against possible future convictions, the court found that
Vasquez Arroyo’s claim was not Heck-barred.223 Unfortunately,
despite the court’s interest in directly addressing the intersection
of § 1983 claims with the habeas statute, it ultimately decided the
issue on the first prong of the inquiry, leaving the second question
for another time.224
3. No Habeas, No Heck Bar
Although the Tenth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether
a § 1983 action applies whenever a plaintiff lacks a habeas
remedy,225 it noted that the boundaries of this intersection of
219. Id. at 1094 (citing Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir.
2007)).
220. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2906(3) (2008).
221. Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1095.
222. Id. at 1095; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (“[T]he
Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists a
conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.” (internal citation and
emphasis omitted)).
223. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1095 (“Here, there is no related
underlying conviction that could be invalidated by Mr. Vasquez’s § 1983
actions.”).
224. See id. at 1096 (“Because we have determined that the Kansas pre-trial
diversion agreements are not outstanding convictions . . . we need not decide
whether Heck applies when the plaintiff lacks an available remedy in habeas.”).
225. See id. (declining to address the intersection of § 1983 and the federal
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statutes remains an open question.226 And indeed this was exactly
the question considered by the Sixth Circuit in S.E. v. Grant
County Board of Education.227 A.E., a juvenile,228 brought a § 1983
suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Grant County
Board of Education and several administrators of her school
system following A.E.’s participation in a diversion program.229
A.E. entered the program as a way to avoid formal court
proceedings stemming from her possession and distribution of one
pill of Adderall, which had been prescribed to her to manage a
hyperactivity disorder.230 She completed the program, after which
charges were diverted and dismissed.231 The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the § 1983 claims “upon
the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey.”232
Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
findings on other grounds,233 the court clarified that the Heck
doctrine would not bar a § 1983 claim from an individual who
completed the state’s pretrial diversion program.234 To reach this
conclusion, the court reviewed the rationale behind the Heck
decision, repeating Justice Scalia’s recognition that Heck’s
favorable termination requirement is analogous to a similar
requirement in the context of malicious prosecution.235 The court
habeas statute).
226. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue and
identifying the ongoing circuit split).
227. 544 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008).
228. Although the juvenile aspect was not important to the court’s
reasoning here, Kentucky’s pretrial diversion statute now formally adds that
“[i]f a child successfully completes a diversion agreement, the underlying
complaint shall be dismissed and further action related to that complainant shall
be prohibited.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.030(9)(a) (West 2019).
229. Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 635.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 636.
232. Id. at 635; S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 522 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 (E.D.
Ky. 2007).
233. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 641 (affirming the district court on the basis
of qualified immunity).
234. See id. at 639 (“Given the facts of this case, where the plaintiff was
neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineligible, we hold that Heck is
inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiff’s claims.”).
235. See id. at 637 (“The requirement that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed, expunged, or invalidated is analogous to the similar requirement in the
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recognized that the Heck bar was intended to prevent duplicative
or parallel litigation,236 but noted that the would-be plaintiff “was
never in custody, was not convicted or sentenced, and was never
eligible for habeas corpus relief.”237 The court focused on whether
or not habeas was available to A.E., relying on the fact that
previous circuit precedent had found that “the Heck bar to § 1983
litigation did not require a favorable termination of the criminal
proceedings for plaintiffs who were not eligible to make habeas
petitions.”238 The court thus implicitly followed Justice Souter’s
approach to the Heck bar.
However, the Sixth Circuit simultaneously noted that the
boundaries of the Heck doctrine remained unsettled, and that their
holding would be in conflict with the Third Circuit’s decision in
Gilles v. Davis239 and other circuits that held otherwise in the
non-pretrial-diversion context.240 In fact, two circuits have
considered the same issue and come to precisely the opposite
conclusion.
B. In Two Circuits, Pretrial Diversion Bars Civil Rights Actions
In contrast to the conclusions drawn by the circuits discussed
above, both the Second and Third Circuits have held that pretrial
diversion programs do constitute convictions for purposes of a
subsequent civil rights action under § 1983.241 The programs
tort of malicious prosecution.”).
236. See id. (“This ensures that habeas corpus remains the exclusive
remedy . . . and does not allow duplicative, collateral attack of convictions or
sentences through § 1983 actions.”).
237. Id. at 638.
238. Id. at 639 (citing Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d
592, 603 (6th Cir. 2007); Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682 (6th Cir.
2005)).
239. 427 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005); see infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Gilles
in detail).
240. See id. (“We announced our disagreement with First, Third, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuit determinations . . . [that] § 1983 claimants who were not eligible
for habeas relief remained bound by Heck’s favorable termination requirement.”).
241. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (finding that defendant’s participation in a
pretrial diversion program that may result in criminal prosecution and is not a
favorable termination); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 855 (2d Cir. 1992)
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considered by these circuits are not markedly different from those
considered by the circuits above. In fact, the Second and Third
Circuits used similar reasoning and justifications242 in coming to a
conclusion diametrically opposite to that of the Sixth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits.243
1. If Guilt Is Still Undetermined, There Is No Right to Bring Suit
Under Section 1983
The Second Circuit decided Roesch v. Otarola244 in November
1992, prior to the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Heck. Although
the decision out of the Second Circuit predates the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heck,245 it squarely addressed the legal issue of
whether participation in a pretrial diversion program constitutes
a conviction,246 and the case is generally cited as adhering to one
side of the circuit split.247 Carl Roesch filed a § 1983 action in the
(affirming the district court because the underlying criminal charge was not
dismissed or set aside in favor of the defendant).
242. Compare Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209 (“By entering the . . . program, the
defendant waives his right to prove his innocence, but at the same time, does not
admit guilt.”), and Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852 (reasoning that the program completed
by the defendant still “leaves open the question of the accused’s guilt”), with
Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[U]nder Kansas
law a diversion is a means to avoid a judgment of criminal guilt.” (citation
omitted)), S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A.E.
was never in custody [and] was not convicted or sentenced.”), and McClish v.
Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here was never a conviction in
the first place.”).
243. See infra Part IV.D (cataloguing the elements cited by the circuits).
244. 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1992).
245. Roesch was decided in 1992; the Supreme Court handed down their
decision in Heck in 1994.
246. See Roesch, 980 F.2d at 853 (“[W]e hold [the] trial rehabilitation program
is not a termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a civil rights suit.”).
247. See, e.g., BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 11:5 (2018) (“The
Second and Third Circuits have gone even further in ruling that Heck applies
even if the plaintiff successfully completes the pretrial diversion program.”);
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, 2018-2
SUPPLEMENT (2018) (identifying a “division of authority” in determining whether
pretrial diversion counted as a conviction for purposes of the Heck doctrine and
collecting cases). But see Huval v. La. State Univ. Police Dep’t,
No. 16-00553-BAJ-RLB, 2018 WL 1095559, at *11, *12 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2018)
(identifying a circuit split between the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits on one
hand, and the Third Circuit on the other, without citing the Second Circuit’s
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United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against
various parties including a police officer, alleging that the parties
conspired to arrest him without probable cause and to revoke his
probation.248 His suit stemmed from a 1986 arrest for breach of the
peace and threatening and harassing his wife’s family.249
Following his arrest, but prior to trial, a state judge admitted
Roesch into Connecticut’s accelerated pretrial rehabilitation
program, which Roesch successfully completed in two years.250
Following completion of the program, all charges against Roesch
were dismissed.251 He then filed his § 1983 suit.252 Finding that “a
disposition pursuant to Connecticut’s accelerated pretrial
rehabilitation statute was not a termination in the appellant’s
favor,” the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants,253 and Roesch appealed.254
The Second Circuit cited several factors in concluding that
Roesch’s participation in a pretrial diversion program following his
1986 arrest precluded him from bringing a § 1983 action relating
to that arrest.255 First, circuit precedent in Singleton v. City of New
York256 (which discussed a similar New York statute) had
previously held that “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal”
was not a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious
prosecution claim.257 Singleton’s precedent was based on the
concept that an adjournment “leaves open the question of the
accused’s guilt.”258 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
decision in Roesch).
248. See Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852 (listing Roesch’s allegations and claims). The
revoked probation stemmed from an earlier, unrelated conviction. Id.
249. See id. (summarizing Roesch’s charges for mailing offensive post cards
and yelling obscenities at his wife’s family in public).
250. See id. (“After Roesch successfully completed the two-year probationary
period, the State Court dismissed the charges against him.”).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 851.
254. Id. at 852.
255. See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 852–54 (2d Cir. 1992) (addressing
the precedential, policy-based, and analogous reasons to affirm the district court).
256. 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980).
257. Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852 (citing Singleton, 632 F.2d at 195).
258. Id.
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program considered in Singleton “provide[d] a method for those
charged . . . by behaving well and abiding by the judge’s
instructions during a designated period to demonstrate that the
charges should not be pursued.”259 Because the court concluded
that the two pretrial diversion programs—Connecticut and New
York—were materially the same, the Singleton precedent held
significant weight.260 This was true despite the court expressly
noting that completion of the program resulted in dismissal, and
complete erasure, of all charges.261 To bring a § 1983 claim, the
court said, would require that the defendant either “pursue the
criminal case to an acquittal” or receive “an unqualified
dismissal.”262
The Second Circuit also considered the practical policy
implications of allowing the § 1983 action to proceed, noting that if
offenders were allowed to pursue civil rights actions, prosecutors
would be less interested in allowing offenders into the program.263
In particular, the program would be “less desirable for the State to
retain and less desirable for the courts to use because the savings
in resources from dismissing the criminal proceeding would be
consumed in resolving the constitutional claims.”264

259. Id.
260. See id. at 853–54 (extensively discussing Singleton and the similarities
between the issues presented in that case and the case before the court with
reference to both pretrial diversion statutes).
261. See id. at 853 (“A person who thinks there is not even probable cause to
believe he committed the crime with which he is charged must pursue the
criminal case to an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else waive his section
1983 claim.”).
262. Id. The court also said that a § 1983 claim cannot allege harm on the
basis of unfairness, only on a violation of due process, and that a pretrial diversion
program is not a violation of due process. Id. at 854.
263. See id. at 853 (“If we permit a criminal defendant to maintain a section
1983 action after taking advantage of accelerated rehabilitation, the program,
intended to give first-time offenders a second chance, would become less desirable
for the State to retain.”).
264. Id.

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION

1803

2. If Not Clearly Innocent, Heck Bar Applies
Several years later, in Gilles v. Davis,265 Timothy Petit and
James Gilles filed a § 1983 suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking damages
following an arrest for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and
failure to disperse.266 Petit was released almost immediately after
the arrest and entered into Pennsylvania’s Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program,267 “which permits
expungement of the criminal record upon successful completion of
a probationary term.”268 Petit completed the program and all
charges were indeed expunged.269 In the § 1983 action, however,
the district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, stating that Petit’s claims were barred under Heck270
and that expungement was not a favorable termination.271 Petit
appealed.272
The Third Circuit immediately turned to the language of
Pennsylvania’s pretrial diversion program.273 The court
acknowledged that, according to the statute, an ARD participant
“avoids trial and potential jail time,”274 and added that “the
purpose of the ARD program is to rehabilitate offenders and
promptly dispose of minor criminal charges.”275 Furthermore, the
265. 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005).
266. See id. at 202 (describing the arrest of Gilles for preaching against
homosexual activity on a college campus and the arrest of Petit for videotaping
the activity).
267. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 301 (2005) (specifying procedures used in
Pennsylvania’s pretrial diversion program).
268. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 202.
269. See id. at 209 (“After a successful probationary period, the charges were
expunged from [Petit’s] criminal record.”).
270. See id. at 208 (“The District Court held that Petit’s claims were barred
under [Heck].”).
271. See id. at 209 (“The District Court found . . . that under Heck
expungement under the ARD Program is not a result ‘favorable’ to the plaintiff.”).
272. See id. at 201 (tracing the claims and issues asserted by the
plaintiff-appellants in the lower court).
273. See id. at 209 (citing the language of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the accompanying comments).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 209 n.9.
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court noted that ARD participation “is not intended to constitute a
conviction.”276 The court then considered how the statute
approaches the question of guilt, stating that “[b]y entering the
ARD program, the defendant waives his right to prove his
innocence, but at the same time, does not admit guilt.”277 Indeed,
the court explained, “both a guilty plea and an ARD are sufficient
to bar a subsequent § 1983 claim.”278 Of course, if both an ARD
diversion program and a guilty plea are sufficient, participation in
the pretrial program must constitute something different than a
plea of guilt.
Nonetheless, the court pointed out that the Heck bar was
intended to prevent parallel litigation or the possibility of “two
conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction.”279 Then,
the court cited to the Second Circuit’s opinion in Roesch280 and a
Fifth Circuit opinion, Taylor v. Gregg,281 which both held that
similar pretrial diversion programs were not favorable
terminations.282 Based on these considerations, the court
concluded that “the ARD program imposes several burdens upon
the criminal defendant not consistent with innocence.”283 Although
the court noted that “the strongest factor supporting the
contention that ARD is a favorable termination is that successful
completion of the ARD program results in dismissal of the criminal
charge and expungement of the arrest record,”284 those
considerations did not outweigh other factors discussed.285

276. Id. at 209.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 209 n.8.
279. Id. at 209.
280. Id. at 211. The Gilles court also traced Roesch’s reliance on Singleton,
which determined that a similar program “le[ft] open the question of guilt.” Id.
281. 36 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1994).
282. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We find instructive
opinions from the Second and Fifth Circuits that have addressed whether similar
pre-trial probationary programs are a favorable termination sufficient to bring a
subsequent civil suit.”).
283. Id. The court also said that probation is “an ‘unfavorable’ period of
judicially imposed limitations on freedom.” Id.
284. Id. at 212 n.14.
285. See id. (“For the reasons noted, however, we believe the ARD program is
not a favorable termination under Heck.”).
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The Gilles opinion is particularly notable for its somewhat
reluctant application of the Heck bar to Petit’s claims. When
considering whether Petit’s lack of habeas relief affected his access
to § 1983 actions,286 the court acknowledged that a plurality of
Supreme Court Justices questioned the use of a Heck bar in such
cases.287 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit refused to challenge
current law and precedent.288 Instead, the court explicitly stated
that it would consider itself bound until the Supreme Court itself
unquestionably overrules or clarifies Heck.289 Meanwhile, in a
dissent, Judge Fuentes argued that the Heck bar could not apply
to Petit because he was not in custody and did not have access to
relief under the habeas statute.290 Judge Fuentes gathered the
votes contained in the various Spencer opinions291 and concluded
that “[u]nder the best reading of Heck and [Spencer], the favorable
termination rule does not apply where habeas relief is
unavailable.”292 Judge Fuentes explained that several circuits have
286. See id. at 210 (mulling the precedential value of the various piecemeal
opinions arising from Spencer on the issue of the intersection of the § 1983 and
habeas statutes).
287. See id. at 209–10 (“We recognize that concurring and dissenting opinions
in [Spencer] question the applicability of Heck to an individual, such as Petit, who
has no recourse under the habeas statute.”); see also Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S.
1, 21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The better view, then, is that a former
prisoner, no longer in custody, may bring a § 1983 action establishing the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement . . . .”); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“Given the Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy
under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that he
may bring an action under § 1983.”).
288. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210 (“We join our sister courts . . . in following the
Supreme Court’s admonition . . . to follow its directly applicable precedent, even
if that precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent
decisions.” (citations omitted)).
289. See id. at 210 (“[We] leave to the Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.” (citations omitted)).
290. See id. at 212 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“Heck’s favorable termination
rule cannot be applied to dismiss a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff not in
custody.” (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500 (1994))).
291. See id. at 217 (“Justice Souter’s concurrence in Spencer was joined by
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Stevens dissented but indicated
that ‘it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that a petitioner who does
not have a remedy under the habeas statute may bring an action under [§ 1983].’”
(citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
292. Id.
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adopted Justice Souter’s narrower interpretation of the favorable
termination rule293 and argued that, in his view, “the District
Court erred when it applied Heck without considering whether
Petit could have brought his claim under habeas.”294 Judge
Fuentes also pointed out that the majority’s opinion relied heavily
on two cases that pre-dated Heck, including the Second Circuit’s
opinion in Roesch.295 Although the majority opinion in Heck relied
on an analogy to malicious prosecution in explicating its
rationale,296 Judge Fuentes instead read Heck as “extend[ing] the
scope of the favorable termination rule in order to reconcile § 1983
with the federal habeas statute.”297
Gilles and Roesch present clear examples of the confusion
surrounding the circuit split addressed in this Note. Although
Gilles hinted at a willingness to allow a § 1983 action to proceed
following participation in a pretrial diversion program, at least in
certain circumstances, the court was hamstrung by the precedents
coming out of the Supreme Court’s competing opinions in Heck and
Spencer.298 Although Roesch predates Heck, the rationale still
supports the use of the Heck bar for pretrial diversion
participants.299 Moreover, comparing Gilles and Roesch with the
cases out of the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits highlights the
precedential morass that surrounds the issue. The five circuits
discussed above are alike only in that not one is able to fully
articulate the state of the law. Such is the situation Christopher
DeLeon faced when deciding whether to accept entry into a pretrial
diversion program.

293. See id. at 218 (summarizing cases out of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits allowing § 1983 actions because they would not interfere with the
purpose of the habeas statute).
294. Id.
295. See id. (pointing out that both Roesch and Singleton were handed down
prior to 1994).
296. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“The common-law
cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of
the type considered here.”).
297. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 219 (3d Cir. 2005) (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
298. See supra notes 287–289 and accompanying text (highlighting the court’s
reluctance to take a stance while the Supreme Court’s position remains unclear).
299. See, e.g., Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (relying on the reasoning used in Roesch
to justify its own conclusions).
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C. An Undecided Circuit: Ongoing Diversion Bars Heck
DeLeon’s situation, granted, was somewhat unique. For one
thing, his pretrial diversion program consisted of a ten year
probationary period.300 For another, pretrial diversion programs
tend to be used for misdemeanor offenses, not for anything as
severe as an assault on a police officer.301 One could easily
speculate as to the kinds of prosecutorial decision-making that
went into trying to keep DeLeon’s civil rights complaint quiet by
offering him pretrial diversion instead. Although the Fifth Circuit
declined to allow DeLeon’s § 1983 lawsuit to proceed at that time,
the court did leave open the possibility of joining the approach
taken by the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.302 Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit recognized and clearly laid out the split in circuit
court jurisprudence on this precise issue.303 Given the Fifth
Circuit’s prior jurisprudence in Taylor, however, it seems that the
court is more likely to join the approach taken by the Second and
Third Circuits if and when the issue is more directly presented.
In DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, the case presented at the
beginning of this Note, Christopher DeLeon appealed the dismissal
of his § 1983 claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and use of excessive force in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.304 At the time of the
decision, DeLeon had not completed his pretrial diversion
requirements;305 if successfully completed, the charge against him
would be dropped.306 The district court reasoned that DeLeon’s
pretrial diversion did not count as a favorable termination under
the terms of Heck and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.307

300. Supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
301. Supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
302. Infra note 308 and accompanying text.
303. Infra notes 309–314 and accompanying text.
304. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007).
305. See id. at 653 (using the future tense to explain that DeLeon’s charges
“will be” dismissed).
306. Id.
307. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, C.A. No. C-05-096, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44191, at *2, *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005).
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Taking up the appeal, the Fifth Circuit first revisited its own
precedents, in which deferred adjudication was treated as the
equivalent of a conviction for sentencing purposes.308 The court
found those precedents non-binding, however, terming them “pure
exercises in statutory interpretation” based on reading the
sentencing guidelines as “anticipat[ing] deferred prosecutions and
pleas of nolo contendere where a conviction is not formally
entered.”309 Instead, the court turned to the rationale behind the
Heck doctrine, highlighting the use of the words “conviction or
sentence” in Heck’s majority opinion.310 Reading Heck, the Fifth
Circuit found that “[f]irst, an order deferring adjudication, though
not formally a conviction or sentence, is its functional equivalent
in light of Heck’s rationale. Second, an order deferring adjudication
is, at least, one stage in an ongoing state criminal proceeding,
which Heck’s rationale might protect.”311 The court then explicitly
laid out the competing rationales of Heck, as espoused by Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion (centered on narrowing the reach of the
§ 1983 statute by analogizing to malicious prosecution actions)312
and Justice Souter’s concurrence (focused on the intersection of
§ 1983 actions with the habeas statute).313 Faced with these two
competing approaches, the court firmly chose the former, writing
that “[t]his circuit remains in the first camp, where Heck stands
first for ‘the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments.’ In short, the common law animated Heck, and
so it lights our way today.”314 Under this approach, the court
mused, the possibility of a future criminal proceeding might act as
308. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 652 (citing United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272
(5th Cir. 1997); Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2005)).
309. Id.
310. See id. (“When a plaintiff alleges tort claims against his arresting
officers, the district court must first consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”
(citation omitted, emphasis in original)).
311. Id. at 654.
312. See supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text (discussing the Heck
majority opinion).
313. See supra notes 156–163 and accompanying text (discussing the Heck
concurrence).
314. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486
(1994)).
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a rationale for barring a subsequent action, since such was the rule
for malicious prosecution cases historically.315 However, after the
Supreme Court foreclosed this approach in Wallace,316 the “ongoing
criminal state criminal proceedings” rationale “lacks merit.”317
Still, the court concluded, the statute suggests that a deferred
adjudication order, which must be signed by a judge, constitutes a
final judicial act.318 This conclusion was supported by prior
decisions by Texas state courts,319 which had previously concluded
that under Texas law “there was a judicial finding that the
evidence substantiated the defendants [sic] guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but not a judicial finding of guilt.”320 The inquiry
into DeLeon’s case could go no further while he remained in the
program.321 This, plus the judge’s ability to impose a variety of
conditions on the defendant,322 was enough for the court to declare
that “a deferred adjudication order is a conviction for the purposes
of Heck’s favorable termination rule.”323 The Fifth Circuit did
explicitly state, however, that it was not addressing the question
of whether a completed deferred adjudication program would also
act to bar a § 1983 action.324 Further, the court modified the district
315. See id. at 655 (“Actions in malicious prosecution were also dismissed,
however, where there was any pending criminal proceeding.” (emphasis in
original)).
316. See supra notes 180–193 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wallace).
317. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2007).
318. See id. at 656 (“[A]lthough the Texas courts have in all circumstances
held that these orders are not convictions, they have been accorded finality, for
instance in the appellate context . . . .”).
319. See id. at 653 (surveying Texas lower courts, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure).
320. Id.
321. See id. (“The proceedings halted at this juncture and were then simply
deferred.”).
322. See id. at 656 n.33 (“The judge may . . . require any reasonable
conditions of community supervision . . . that a judge could impose on a defendant
placed on community supervision for a conviction that was probated and
suspended, including conviction.” (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12,
sec. 5(a) (West 2007))).
323. Id. at 656.
324. See id. (“This case does not require that we decide whether a successfully
completed deferred adjudication, with its more limited collateral consequences
under Texas law, is also a conviction for the purposes of Heck, and we do not
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court’s order of dismissal to make clear that the complaint was
dismissed with prejudice only until the defendant could meet the
threshold conditions required to bring a § 1983 suit without
violating the Heck bar.325 Simultaneously the court put forth the
possibility that DeLeon might have access to the habeas statute
after completing the terms of his deferred adjudication.326 In other
words, following DeLeon the Fifth Circuit remains unresolved as
to whether completion of a pretrial diversion program would be
sufficient to bar a subsequent § 1983 action under Heck.
Although DeLeon is the most recent case out of the Fifth
Circuit, additional guidance as to how the court might rule on a
plaintiff who, unlike DeLeon, completed his pretrial diversion
program before bringing a § 1983 claim comes from the circuit’s
earlier decision in Taylor v. Gregg. The Taylor case, handed down
just months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck, involved
an action for malicious prosecution in which the defendants
entered pretrial diversion programs before bringing their
claims.327 The court explained that “pre-trial diversion is an
alternative to prosecution that diverts certain offenders from
traditional criminal justice processing into a program of
supervision.”328 Furthermore, the court differentiated between
acknowledging responsibility, as required to enter the program,
versus admitting guilt, which the program does not require.329 The
issue before the court was “whether a pre-trial diversion
agreement terminates the criminal action in the plaintiff’s favor”
such that the plaintiff might bring a malicious prosecution
claim.330 Although the issue was, at the time, an issue of first
decide that question.”).
325. See id. at 657 (“A preferred order of dismissal in Heck cases decrees,
‘Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again until
the Heck conditions are met.’ We will modify the judgment accordingly.” (citation
omitted)).
326. See id. (“We do not decide whether DeLeon . . . otherwise may pursue
federal habeas relief by successfully completing his deferred adjudication.”).
327. See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Thereafter,
Appellants entered into a pre-trial diversion agreement with the United States
Attorney’s Office. Appellants subsequently filed suit.”).
328. Id.
329. See id. (“The offenders must acknowledge responsibility for their actions,
but need not admit guilt.”).
330. Id.
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impression for the Fifth Circuit,331 the court drew inspiration from
the Second Circuit’s decision in Singleton.332 Relying largely on
reasons of public policy,333 the Fifth Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in holding that “[e]ntering a pretrial-diversion
agreement does not terminate the criminal action in favor of the
criminal defendant.”334 Based on this reasoning, it seems likely
that even if DeLeon had completed his pretrial diversion program,
the Fifth Circuit may have followed its own reasoning in Taylor in
determining that the potential chilling effect of allowing a § 1983
action to proceed would be enough of a deterrent to hold DeLeon’s
claim barred under Heck. After all, the Second Circuit similarly
based its decision in Roesch on its earlier decision in Singleton in
concluding that § 1983 actions would be barred for pretrial
diversion participants.335
D. Elements Considered by the Circuit Courts
As seen from the case summaries above, the circuits
considered a wide variety of rationales in assessing the question of
the Heck bar in the context of pretrial diversion. The Third, Fifth,
and Sixth Circuits explicitly followed the reasoning of the Heck
majority, which weighed the importance of avoiding parallel
litigation by analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution.336
331. See id. (“The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a pre-trial
diversion agreement is a favorable termination of a criminal action for purposes
of maintaining a malicious prosecution claim.”).
332. See id. at 455–56 (tracing the reasoning of Singleton in determining that
“an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is far from being in all respects
favorable to the defendant” (citations omitted)).
333. See id. at 456 (describing the “chilling effect” on prosecutorial willingness
to allow pretrial diversion if doing so would leave the door open to collateral
attacks).
334. Id.
335. See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 851–54 (2d Cir. 1992) (comparing
Roesch’s case to the facts and legal precedent of Singleton throughout the
discussion and analysis).
336. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“The requirement that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged,
or invalidated is analogous to the similar requirement in the tort of malicious
prosecution and is called the ‘favorable termination’ requirement of Heck.”);
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Our
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Two circuits, the Sixth and Eleventh, highlighted the fact that no
sentence was imposed in the pretrial programs at issue.337 All
circuits acknowledged that there is no formal conviction involved
under the statutory language of the specific pretrial diversion
programs considered, though the language used by the circuits
varies.338 For example, the Second Circuit found that the
Connecticut program “leaves open the question of guilt,”339 while
the Third Circuit reasoned that the a defendant participating in
the Pennsylvania program is neither guilty nor innocent.340 The
Fifth Circuit considered the Texas diversion program to be the
“functional equivalent” of a conviction.341
Five of the circuits (Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh)
considered the alternate possibility of habeas relief,342 although
decisional path begins at Heck itself. The Heck Court held that a civil tort action,
including an action under section 1983, is not an appropriate vehicle for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”); Gilles v. Davis, 427
F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In Heck, the Court held a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim was subject to the common law requirement that the plaintiff
show the prior criminal proceeding terminated in his favor.”).
337. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 636 (“We note that in [the cited case], the
plaintiff had been sentenced, unlike in the instant case.”); McClish v. Nugent, 483
F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he charge was eventually dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to Florida’s pretrial intervention program.”).
338. See Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The
diversion agreements resulted in deferral of prosecution of the offenses at issue.
As a consequence, under Kansas law there are no outstanding judgments or
convictions or sentences.”); Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 636 (“A.E. was charged in
juvenile court with a trafficking violation that was diverted and dismissed after
A.E. satisfied her diversion contract.”); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654 (“With deferred
adjudication, there is no judgment of conviction and no sentence.”); McClish, 483
F.3d at 1251 (“Holmberg was never convicted of any crime.”); Gilles, 427 F.3d at
211 (describing the diversionary period as “an ‘unfavorable’ period of judicially
imposed limitations on freedom in which the probationer’s violation of the
program’s terms may result in criminal prosecution”); Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852–
53 (“If the accused meets the conditions set by the court, the charges are
dismissed, and all records of the charges are erased pursuant to [the statute].”).
339. Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852.
340. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209 (“By entering the . . . program, the defendant
waives his right to prove his innocence, but at the same time, does not admit
guilt.”).
341. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654.
342. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1094 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the intersection of habeas with § 1983); Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at
639 (revisiting a prior case in which the Fifth Circuit had considered the
intersection of the habeas and § 1983 statutes); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654
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only the Third and Sixth Circuits addressed it explicitly. Both of
those circuits found that the defendant before them did not have
recourse to habeas relief. However, they then came to opposite
conclusions. For the Sixth Circuit, a lack of habeas relief meant
that a § 1983 action should be available,343 while for the Third
Circuit the lack of habeas relief did not change the unavailability
of § 1983.344 Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit gestured at the
habeas remedy discussion in Spencer, but did not rely on it.345
Although the courts’ reasoning tended to rely on the elements
above, the courts also considered both circuit precedent and the
purpose of the pretrial diversion statutes, aspects which
necessarily vary by jurisdiction. For example, the Second, Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits considered persuasive authority either
from their own related decisions,346 opinions in other circuits,347 or
similarly situated state courts.348 This played a particularly
(acknowledging and dismissing Justice Souter’s concurring rationale in Spencer
v. Kenma); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1251 n.19 (“The logic of our reasoning . . . is clear:
If Heck only bars § 1983 claims when the alternative remedy of habeas corpus is
available, then Heck has no application to Holmberg’s claim.”); Gilles, 427 F.3d at
209 (“We recognize that concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer v. Kenma
question the applicability of Heck to an individual, such as Petit, who has no
recourse under the habeas statute.” (citation omitted)).
343. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 639 (“[W]e announced our disagreement with
[other circuit courts] that, in spite of the Spencer decision, § 1983 claimants who
were not eligible for habeas relief remained bound by Heck’s favorable
termination requirement.”).
344. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210 (“But these opinions do not affect our
conclusion that Heck applies to Petit’s claims.”).
345. See McClish, 483 F.3d at 1251 n.19 (citing a prior case in which the
circuit court interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinions in Spencer v. Kenma as a
majority of the Court “express[ing] the view that § 1983 claims are barred only
when the alternative remedy of habeas relief is available”).
346. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 637–39 (citing the reasoning from two prior
Sixth Circuit cases); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We are
unpersuaded that these previously rejected arguments form a basis for
distinguishing the Connecticut provision, and we have no authority to reconsider
the holding in Singleton.”).
347. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008
(exploring the reasoning in Gilles); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir.
2005) (“We find instructive opinions from the Second and Fifth Circuits that have
addressed whether similar pretrial probationary programs are a favorable
termination sufficient to bring a subsequent civil suit.”).
348. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 653–55 (5th Cir.
2007) (citing similar opinions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the
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interesting role in the Third Circuit decision, Gilles, in which the
court suggested that it might otherwise allow a § 1983 action to
proceed, but felt bound by the language of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Heck.349 Meanwhile, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits
assessed the purpose of the relevant pretrial diversion statute to
determine whether the legislature intended the program to be
considered a conviction.350 These jurisdiction-specific rationales,
which further muddied the waters of the circuit split, are another
reason a coherent resolution of the split would benefit the lower
courts and the defendants seeking to access them.
V. Three Proposals for Resolving the Split
Given the confusion in the lower courts described above, the
Supreme Court must now step in to settle this area of law. Several
approaches hinted at in the decisions above offer possible paths.
These include the habeas-centric approach espoused by Judge
Fuentes, dissenting in part in Gilles v. Davis,351 the
future-conviction approach discussed by Justice Scalia in Wallace
v. Kato,352 and the distinction between “challenges to procedures”
Missouri Supreme Court, and the California Supreme Court).
349. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210 (“We doubt that Heck has been undermined,
but to the extent its continued validity has been called into question,
we . . . follow[] the Supreme Court’s admonition to lower federal courts to follow
its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened . . . .”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
350. See Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“[U]nder Kansas law a diversion is a means to avoid a judgment of criminal guilt,
the opposite of a conviction in a criminal action.”); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 655
(“Deferred adjudication was not intended as a radical departure, rather, the
Texas legislature enacted these procedures with the purpose to remove from
existing statutes the limitations that have acted as barriers to effective systems
of community supervision.” (citation and internal ellipses omitted)); Gilles, 427
F.3d at 209 (“The Comment to Rule 312 of the [statute] states that ‘acceptance
into an ARD program is not intended to constitute a conviction,’ but ‘it may be
statutorily construed as a conviction for purposes of computing sentences on
subsequent convictions.’” (citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 312)).
351. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 212 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder Heck and
Spencer . . . Heck’s favorable termination rule cannot be applied to dismiss a
§ 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff not in custody.”).
352. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (“What petitioner seeks, in
other words, is the adoption of a principle that goes well beyond Heck: that an
action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought
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and “challenges to judgments” mentioned in McClish.353 These
possible resolutions will be assessed in turn.
A. Exploring the Intersection of Federal Habeas and Section 1983
The first proposal traces the split between the Heck majority
rationale and Justice Souter’s Heck concurrence, a dichotomy
which is clearly laid out in Judge Fuentes’s dissent in Gilles. Judge
Fuentes summarized his dissent in Gilles by saying that “under
Heck and Spencer . . . Heck’s favorable termination rule cannot be
applied to dismiss a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff not in
custody.”354 Indeed, Judge Fuentes characterized the majority’s
opinion dismissing the plaintiff’s claim as based on a faulty
assumption that the Heck question even applied to his situation.355
On the contrary, Judge Fuentes suggested, a proper reading of
Heck and Spencer requires that “the favorable termination rule
does not apply where habeas relief is unavailable.”356 Judge
Fuentes’s approach directly picked up where Justice Souter left off
in Spencer, reiterating the importance of “avoid[ing] collisions at
the intersection of habeas and § 1983.”357 Indeed, the majority
opinion in McClish took the same approach, arguing that the
plaintiff’s suit “does not represent the sort of collateral attack
foreclosed by Heck for the straightforward reason that it is not
collateral to anything—the § 1983/habeas conflict addressed in

until that conviction occurs and is set aside. The impracticality of such a rule
should be obvious.”).
353. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007)
The primary category of cases barred by Heck involved suits seeking
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.
However, the Court also noted that a second category of cases—suits
to recover damages “for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”—raised
similar conflicts. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
354. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 212 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
355. See id. at 216 (“Like the District Court, the majority assumes that the
favorable termination rule in Heck applies to Petit’s claim. But because Petit was
not in custody when he filed his § 1983 action, Heck does not apply.”).
356. Id. at 217.
357. Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 20 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring).
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Heck is nonexistent when, as here, there was never a conviction in
the first place.”358
This habeas-centric approach is an appealing resolution to the
split because of its simplicity and the clear, bright-line rule it offers
for courts. Under this approach, if the plaintiff bringing a § 1983
action is not in custody at the time, the Heck doctrine does not bar
his or her suit. All of the plaintiffs in the cases above, therefore,
would have access to the courts through § 1983, as none of them
were in custody at the time they initiated their suit. This includes
Christopher DeLeon, who was still participating in his pretrial
diversion program but who was not officially in custody and, as the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged, was without access to a habeas
proceeding.359 Furthermore, this approach allows more access to
the courts for plaintiffs who have a justifiable claim against a state
actor for the deprivation of rights. A plaintiff who can assert a
legitimate claim under § 1983, like DeLeon, should not be unduly
barred by a threshold issue such as the Heck doctrine. Such a bar
subverts the very purpose of § 1983, which exists in part to protect
individuals against abuses of power by the state.360
One limitation to this approach, however, is that participants
still enrolled in a pretrial diversion program remain eligible to
have charges re-filed against them, should they fail to complete the
program successfully. Because the burden of a civil suit at the
same time the plaintiff remains under threat of conviction is
exactly what Heck was intended to guard against,361 a resolution
along these lines might require that plaintiffs remain barred by
the Heck doctrine until they have completed their pretrial
diversion successfully. Another limitation is that a habeas-centric
approach to Heck cases involving pretrial diversion programs
would not actually legally define pretrial diversion programs as
“convictions” or “not convictions” in a meaningful way. In other
358. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1251.
359. See supra notes 304–307 and accompanying text (enumerating the
specifics of DeLeon’s case).
360. See supra Part II.A (discussing the enactment and purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, including the § 1983 cause of action).
361. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“This requirement
avoids parallel litigation . . . and precludes the possibility of the claimant
succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying
criminal prosecution.”).
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words, taking such an approach would have little, if any, impact
on the question of whether a pretrial diversion program constitutes
(or rather, should constitute) a conviction for purposes of
sentencing, immigration, or other subsequent suits.
Finally, the most significant barrier to taking this approach is
that it does nothing to resolve the debate over whether to follow
the rationale of the Heck majority or that of Justice Souter’s Heck
concurrence and the pieced together Spencer “majority.” Indeed, an
entirely different circuit split has sprung up around this debate.362
While the bright line rule is appealing in theory, it would therefore
likely be ineffective in practice.
B. Focusing on Anticipated Future Convictions
A second resolution would take inspiration from Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in Wallace, in which he criticized the idea
that the Heck bar could be extended to cover “action[s] which would
impugn an anticipated future conviction.”363 In Wallace, the
petitioner tried to argue that the statute of limitations for his
§ 1983 suit was tolled until any possibility of conviction was set
aside.364 According to the petitioner’s argument, the Heck doctrine
implied that if there was any possible future cause of action that
might bar his § 1983 suit, the statute of limitations could not
possibly accrue until all of those potential future convictions either
took place (thereby barring the suit) or were invalidated (thereby
allowing the suit to go forward).365 Justice Scalia maligned the
highly uncertain nature of this inquiry, noting that “[t]he
impracticality of such a speculative rule is obvious.”366
However, following Justice Scalia’s reasoning leads to
interesting implications for the Heck bar in the context of pretrial
362. See, e.g., Defining the Reach, supra note 134, at 868 (analyzing the circuit
split over whether an individual’s access to habeas necessarily bars a subsequent
§ 1983 suit).
363. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (emphasis in original).
364. See id. at 391 (“This would end the matter, were it not for petitioner’s
contention that Heck v. Humphrey compels the conclusion that his suit could not
accrue until the State dropped its charges against him.” (citation omitted)).
365. Id. at 393.
366. Id. at 385.
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diversion programs. If a speculative, future conviction is clearly no
bar to a § 1983 action under Heck, a pretrial diversion program
that leaves open the possibility of charges while the program is in
process should not be a bar, either. Of course, the possibility of
charges being re-filed during participation in a pretrial diversion
program is much less speculative than the future convictions that
Justice Scalia imagined in Wallace. Nonetheless, the boundary
that Justice Scalia placed on Heck in Wallace—that future
convictions are not contemplated by the Heck bar—might lead to
creative, if somewhat attenuated, arguments that pretrial
diversion programs only create the possibility of conviction, not a
conviction in and of itself.
To put this in context, consider Christopher DeLeon, who was
given a ten year probation as part of a deferred adjudication
program.367 DeLeon filed a § 1983 action while still serving his
probation, and remained under the threat of a possible future
conviction as long as that period of time lasted. Under a
Wallace-inspired rule, the fact that DeLeon’s charges were not yet
dismissed should not bar his § 1983 action, because to bar the
action purely based on an anticipated future conviction would be,
as Justice Scalia puts it, “impractical.” On the other hand, given
that DeLeon and the courts were aware of the charges hanging
over his head, his possible future conviction for those charges due
to some violation of his probation does not seem particularly
speculative.368 In fact, the Fifth Circuit explicitly recognized that,
prior to Wallace, an ongoing criminal proceedings rationale to
support the Heck bar might have worked well as a rule.369 But it
did not then suggest that the opposite might be true—that,
post-Wallace, ongoing criminal proceedings would by definition not
bar a § 1983 suit under Heck. Indeed, such a rule would probably
push Justice Scalia’s dictum, that “action[s] which would impugn
367. See supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (recounting DeLeon’s case).
368. The exact terms of DeLeon’s probation are not clear from the case, but in
general “[n]early a third of the roughly 2.3 million people who exit probation or
parole annually fail to successfully complete their supervision for a wide range of
reasons, such as committing new crimes, violating the rules, and absconding.”
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH
STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/BNG4-M5SS (PDF).
369. See supra notes 315–317 and accompanying text (tracing the Fifth
Circuit’s consideration of Wallace).
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an anticipated future conviction” do not fall under the Heck bar,
too far. While convictions under pretrial diversion are not certain,
they are also not particularly speculative.
C. Splitting Adjudication from Investigation
However, at least one additional bright line rule emerges from
these cases, one which relies on being able to split adjudicative
proceedings (such as hearings or trials) from investigatory
procedures (pursuits, arrests, police interviews, and the like).
Using different terms, the majority opinion in McClish discussed
these two different kinds of conflicts, either of which might give
rise to the Heck threshold question.370 One, the kind of suit most
often barred by Heck, “involved suits seeking damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.”371 The other
category described in McClish included cases to recover “for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid.”372 The first category involves
§ 1983 actions that challenge the judgment entered against the
plaintiff, which in the context of pretrial diversion programs would
mean challenges to the decision to enter a pretrial diversion
program at all. These challenges would likely be rare or impossible
to field, in this context, in part because a participant in the
program technically enters voluntarily and would have little to
challenge in the adjudicative process.373 The second category,
however, in the context of pretrial diversion programs, would
include challenges to the investigatory procedures that brought
the alleged offender before the court in the first place. These
370. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Heck
articulated two different categories of cases where conflicts might arise.”).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., NAPSA, supra note 48, at 5 (defining pretrial diversion as “any
voluntary option that provides alternative criminal case processing for a
defendant charged with a crime”). Of course, “voluntary” is a somewhat relative
term, given the countless collateral consequences that often accompany
convictions. See, e.g., National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, supra note 31, at 1 (providing a database of the numerous collateral
implications stemming from having a criminal record).
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challenges would include those brought by Christopher DeLeon,
whose § 1983 action sought to challenge the validity of his arrest
and the use of force by the officer who entered his home, as well as
those of many of the other plaintiffs in the cases described above.
Tracing the Heck bar along these lines would allow plaintiffs with
a cognizable § 1983 claim to move forward, while still upholding
the premises of the Heck doctrine by maintaining the legitimacy of
the underlying pretrial diversion “conviction.” Indeed, Justice
Scalia himself recognized the division between the two categories
in Spencer.374 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia explained that
“[i]f, for example, petitioner were to seek damages for using the
wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result, and if that
procedural defect did not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
revocation, then Heck would have no application [at] all.”375
Identifying challenges to procedural defects as challenges in the
investigatory process, and challenges to “the wrong result” as
challenges to the adjudication process, would establish a rule that
would help lower courts identify exactly where to draw the line
when faced with a would-be plaintiff who was also a participant in
a pretrial diversion program. If that individual wanted to
challenge his or her legal proceedings, including the procedures
through which he or she entered into pretrial diversion, such a suit
would be barred under Heck. If, however, an individual wanted to
challenge the search that led to his arrest, or the circumstances of
her arrest, those challenges would not be Heck-barred.
While this approach would still be somewhat labor-intensive,
requiring courts to delve into the specific facts of each plaintiff’s
previous participation in the justice system, such a rule would be
more in line with the primary intent of Heck, which was to prevent
collateral attacks on otherwise final judgments.376 Equally
important, it would allow more access to the courts for those
plaintiffs who, like DeLeon, have a cognizable § 1983 claim, assert
legitimate complaints against a state actor, and who should not be
barred from these claims merely because they have entered a
374. See Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (articulating differences
between the two categories).
375. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
376. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1994) (“This Court has
long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and has generally
declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack.”).
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pretrial diversion program under which they have not been
“convicted” in any real sense.
Of the three proposals explored above, the proposal suggested
by the majority opinion in McClish best aligns with both the
purpose of the § 1983 statute and the policy considerations that
undergird the Heck line of cases. Section 1983, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, primarily acts to protect individuals against
the abuse of state power.377 In addition, although § 1983 is not
coequal with the common law, common law principles should be
used as an aid to interpret it.378 Drawing a line between challenges
to adjudicative determinations and challenges to investigatory
proceedings maintains the rights of individuals against the state,
because they will still be able to challenge acts that have violated
their constitutional rights. Simultaneously, it does not conflict
with the rationale offered in Heck, which leverages the similarities
between § 1983 and the common law tort action for malicious
prosecution to show that collateral attacks on legitimate
convictions should not be allowed.379 It would also take care of the
Sixth Circuit’s concern that allowing collateral challenges for those
in pretrial diversion would have a chilling effect on prosecutors’
willingness to offer pretrial diversion,380 because prosecutors
would know that the adjudication process—the negotiation and
acceptance of the pretrial diversion—would not be subject to
challenge.
Establishing a bright line between challenges to adjudication
and challenges to investigatory procedures also answers several,
although not all, of the policy concerns that arise when pretrial
diversion participants are barred from bringing § 1983 actions
purely because of their participation in the program. Does any
court really think it is fair to pretrial diversion participants to have
377. Supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
378. Supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (tracing Justice Scalia’s
rationale).
380. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing the lower court as agreeing “that it would constitute poor public policy to
permit a criminal defendant to obtain lenient treatment by submitting to a
benevolent program of this kind and then turn around and sue the arresting
officer”).
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their civil rights suits, alleging unconstitutional behavior by a
person acting “under color of” state law, barred purely because
they have entered into pretrial diversion? Given the multitude of
collateral consequences that stem from a criminal conviction,
concerns about maintaining family and work relationships, and
the distressing experience of being in prison in general, an
individual’s choice to accept pretrial diversion should not have to
be at the expense of their right to pursue justice. The
adjudicative-investigatory divide helps solve this unenviable
dilemma. In addition, the rule would ensure equal treatment to
individuals asserting a federal cause of action despite the fact that
pretrial diversion programs vary by state.
Some issues remain. For example, such a rule would preclude
an individual from challenging a prosecutor’s decision to not offer
pretrial diversion at all, especially if the individual felt that such
a decision was being made on racial or other constitutionally
protected grounds. Given that legislatures manage the
implementation of state pretrial diversion programs, however,
they would also be able to appropriately set up mechanisms to
combat this potential issue.381
Whatever the approach, a clearer rule of law in this area would
protect the individual’s right to negotiate freely and to choose his
or her own path with full knowledge of the potential consequences.
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent in Spencer, cites a litany of
cases for the proposition that above all, “[t]he individual’s right to
the protection of his own good name reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”382 As
it currently stands, an individual entering into a pretrial diversion
program in many jurisdictions cannot know whether he will lose
his right to bring a § 1983 action under the Heck bar, because the

381. See, e.g., DOJ RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 2 (summarizing the
implementation of statewide diversion programs). But see Shaila Dewan &
Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2016, at A1 (“Prosecutors exert almost total control over diversion, deciding
who deserves mercy and at what price . . . The prosecutors who grant diversion
often benefit directly from the fees . . . .”).
382. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 24 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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courts themselves cannot decide. With such stakes, the image
presented is hardly one of a “decent system of ordered liberty.”383
VI. Conclusion
As pretrial diversion programs proliferate, courts will have to
assess an increasing number of issues having to do with the
collateral
consequences
stemming
from
these
programs—including, for example, immigration,384 state and
federal sentencing,385 juvenile sentencing,386 and even how to
adapt procedural rules to recognize the possibility of deferred
adjudication.387 By clarifying the Heck rule in the context of
pretrial diversion programs, the Supreme Court will give lower
courts the guidance they need to deal fairly with plaintiffs who
wish to assert a civil rights action under § 1983. More importantly,
it will allow people like Christopher DeLeon to enter pretrial
diversion programs with full awareness of all the potential
383. Id.
384. See, e.g., SHANE DIZON & NADINE K. WETTSTEIN, Definition and Analysis
of Convictions for Immigration Purposes, in 3 IMMIGRATION L. SERV. 2d § 13:21
(2018 Update) (identifying a circuit split in determining whether adjudications
are final before commencing deportation proceedings).
385. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Melgar, 591 F.3d 733, 737 (4th Cir.
2010) (finding defendant’s participation in a drug treatment program did not
count as a conviction under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when it was not
shown he admitted guilt in open court); United States v. Jones, 448 F.3d 958, 960
(7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t should be clear that whatever the semantics of the terms
‘conviction’ and ‘sentence,’ court-ordered dispositions of supervision are properly
counted in the computation of criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2.”). The
Guidelines state that, when determining a range, “[d]iversion from the judicial
process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution) is not counted. A
diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt . . . is
counted as a sentence . . . even if a conviction is not formally entered.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004)
(emphasis added).
386. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Hochberg, Note, Should Juvenile Adjudications
Count as Prior Convictions for Apprendi Purposes?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1159 (2004) (evaluating a circuit split that existed as of 2004 in the context of
sentencing determinations).
387. See, e.g., United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46
(D.D.C. 2015) (assessing in detail the interaction of deferred prosecution
agreements with the Speedy Trial Act).
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collateral consequences. The most effective rule to accomplish
these goals would be to separate challenges to adjudication from
challenges to investigatory procedures, maintaining the Heck bar
for the former but eliminating it for the latter.

